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Abstract 
 
 The common narrative of the 1920s is either to largely ignore the nation during 
this time and the men who presided over it or to simply dismiss the decade as a time of 
isolationism and Republican failure and the three presidents as corrupt, lazy, silent, or 
incompetent. The problems of the more typical narratives are most starkly shown in the 
realm of foreign policy. A more thorough examination of the role of President Calvin 
Coolidge and the American nation in that area reveals something very different. Because, 
if we approach those years as a “historical way station on the road to the New Deal” and 
Coolidge’s Presidency as years of inaction then we will miss much of the reality of not 
only Coolidge’s thoughts and actions while President, but also this nation’s deep and 
complex level of global interaction that occurred during those interwar years.  
The best way to challenge the normal narrative is granting even greater voice to 
President Calvin Coolidge himself. He wrote and delivered hundreds of speeches during 
his political career, presidential or otherwise. Through his presidential speeches we see 
not inaction and inactivity, but thoughtful and prudent action and an expectation of other 
men in his administration to do their jobs. Instead of a United States cut off from the 
world, hoarding her wealth, ignoring pleas for help, and sitting alone in isolation, we are 
provided glimpses of global and regional cooperation, the expansion of international 
trade, and the desire to create peace separately from political entanglements like the 
League of Nations. These visions of President Coolidge and American foreign policy in 
the 1920s should change the way we think about and teach the period.
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 Calvin Coolidge was not supposed be president in August of 1923. The sudden 
death of the elected president, Warren G. Harding, on August 2, 1923 thrust Coolidge 
into the spotlight. This type of transition is not uncommon in American history, but a 
sudden change of leaders like this is vastly different from a normal transfer of power at 
election time. Such successions are different; allow no time for preparation as they are 
“unscheduled, usually unpredicted, and sudden.”1  Stepping into his new role, Coolidge 
would first have to “assure the government and the country of continuity and to promise 
his loyal pursuit of his predecessor’s policies.”2  Approaching Coolidge’s presidency with 
this understanding changes the way we view his actions prior to the election of 1924, and 
those that followed during his own term in office. Thinking about this transition and 
specifically how it applies to the realm of foreign policy we can see those responses made 
by Coolidge and the direction of the nation’s policy in a new light.   
What do we mean by foreign policy? This term is many times misapplied or used 
to mean something analogous to terms like diplomacy and foreign relations. Historian 
Richard Leopold created an outstanding definition and differentiation for these terms: 
“By foreign policy I mean those objectives and aims set by the government for promoting 
the nation’s interest and welfare in the world at large. Diplomacy I take to be the art or 
profession of transacting business among governments. Foreign relations I define as the 
                                                          
1 Frederick C. Mosher, W. David Clinton, and Daniel G. Lang, Presidential Transitions and Foreign Affairs 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 38.  
2 Mosher, Clinton, and Lang, Presidential Transitions and Foreign Affairs, 40.  
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sum total of all connections – official, private, commercial, and cultural – among 
different countries and different peoples.”3   
As for Calvin Coolidge’s foreign policy he believed strongly in non-intervention 
and possessed a very nationalistic outlook that would greatly affect his attitudes towards 
world politics. While he differed greatly from Wilson, they both viewed America and her 
people as exceptional. Their difference of opinion surrounded how that exceptional spirit 
could best be used to the world’s benefit. Coolidge wanted to wield our booming 
economic sector to profit from and improve the world. Wilson, on the other hand, wanted 
to spread democracy and in a sense expand the ideals of the Monroe Doctrine world-
wide. Americans were not isolationists, despite what is commonly portrayed, then and 
Coolidge was forced to deal with the effects of revolutions in places like China, Mexico, 
and Russia, naval disarmament debates, the World Court, war reparations and war debts, 
and the international and national calls for peace. The foreign policy of his administration 
shows Coolidge’s belief in and his ability to delegate tasks to people who he feels can 
handle any problems that may arise.  
The bookends of World War I and World War II greatly overshadow the peace 
and prosperity that was afforded Americans in the 1920s. This was not a time of isolation 
or of inaction on the part of the American people either. There was trading to be done, 
peace to be fought for, though both rarely required a shot to be fired by Americans. 
Revolutions from years earlier were continuing to reverberate or boil over again all 
around the world. Mexico, Nicaragua, China and Russia were all experiencing shouts for 
                                                          
3 Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 
viii.  
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freedom, change, and death. The United States was not yet the global power we all 
imagine striding out of the Second World War victorious, but it was not far from it. It 
was one of the few nations of sufficient industrial power that had escaped the First World 
War relatively unscathed and stood to gain from a wide range of credits extended during 
and shortly after. There was power in that. Wilson had grand plans to sit at the head of 
the League of Nations. Congress, the American people, and the next two presidents had 
very different ideas. The political discontent of those nations, either neighbors or far 
abroad, would need to be addressed by diplomatic poise or the end of a rifle.  
The political climate of the post-war 1920s lent itself to the former and the actions 
of both presidents’ administrations reflect this precious knowledge of public opinion. The 
starkness of the policy shifts during this period are best seen through a reexamination of 
the nation’s foreign policy under Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge particularly.  Through 
Coolidge’s speeches, we are offered a glimpse of both what Americans wanted to hear 
and what their president wanted to tell them. Coolidge and his speeches will be the lens 
through which we can best see how our nation really responded to a changing role in the 
world.  
Thinking about these questions, concerns about foreign policy and how they 
might apply to the presidency of Calvin Coolidge, is my goal. The main avenue of 
understanding the concerns he had about foreign policy can be garnered through the 
many speeches he gave during his years in office. By deeply analyzing the speeches that 
Coolidge personally wrote and delivered during his time as president we are able to see 
both the ideology driving him and the rhetoric that was appealing to so many Americans 
during the 1920s. The starkness of these ideas is most vividly displayed in the realm of 
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foreign policy – a realm where both he and the nation deserve much more attention from 
scholars.  
My argument owes much to the work of other historians and writers even though 
this approach, drawing so heavily from Coolidge’s speeches, has never been done before. 
There are, however, books that have attempted to understand the mind and rhetorical 
origins of Coolidge’ ideas and actions as president. Chief among these are L. John Van 
Til’s Thinking Cal Coolidge: An Inquiry into the Roots of His Intellectual Life and 
Charles C. Johnson’s Why Coolidge Matters: Leadership Lessons from America’s Most 
Underrated President. These have made use of the plethora of early writings (the 
published ones) as well as materials from his college years at Amherst. Yet neither has 
made the final leap into looking at the finished product of his presidential speeches and 
addresses. Johnson’s work is one of the two most recent biographies on Coolidge and, 
surprisingly, he fails to make use of the speeches available through the Library of 
Congress and other non-published sources. Their efforts were not wasted as they offer us 
both context and understanding of the origins and depth of President Coolidge’s ideals 
and knowledge that radiate throughout these speeches.  
As to any writings on Calvin Coolidge’s foreign policy, there is nothing written in 
any book length format about his foreign policy generally. There are a few theses and 
published books worthy of note that address specific aspects of his international policies 
and ideas. The best of the former is Steven R. Hall’s “Glimpses of Wilsonianism: United 
States involvement in Nicaragua during the Coolidge era” and Aykut Kilinc’s “Oil, honor 
and religion: United States foreign policy towards Turkey, 1923—1927.” Hall’s 
argument is fascinating for its attempt to show that Coolidge’s administration was in 
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Nicaragua not just to keep the peace and allow for free elections, but to actually change 
the world’s behavior by spreading democracy and civilization to nations like Nicaragua. 
While there are many positives about this work, it still falls into the trap of assuming too 
much isolationism for this period and may be confusing a complicated situation where 
Coolidge exhibits more of a Monroe Doctrine type of thought instead of echoing 
Wilsonian ideology. Coolidge appears more concerned with American security and 
regional stability, than with necessarily saving the world. The issues involved with 
Coolidge and Nicaragua will be explored further in Chapter Three.  
Kilinc’s work is likewise fascinating, but for different reasons. Discussions of 
foreign policy during this period are rare; discussions about non-European or non-Central 
America are even rarer.4 This argument focuses on the discussions and policies swirling 
around the Lausanne Treaty that was originally negotiated between the United States and 
Turkey in 1923, but after meeting strong, unexpected resistance from the American 
public it would not be until 1927 that Coolidge would ignore the vote of Senate and sign 
it into law anyway. Kilnic blames this reaction and the years of foot-dragging on “the 
Armenian situation and the preconceived prejudices against Muslims and Turks.”5  Both 
theses discuss the impact of ideology and the importance of public opinion upon foreign 
policy during the 1920s. These are themes that will also impact the conclusions being 
made here as Coolidge seems keenly aware of the calls for peace in the wake of World 
                                                          
4 The only two works that directly address US policy towards Turkey during this period are Leland James 
Gordon’s American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation (1932) and Roger 
Trask’s The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939 (1971). As you can see 
by the publication dates, there is certainly much lacking from recent scholarship on this topic.  
5 Aykut Kilinc, “Oil, honor and religion: United States foreign policy towards Turkey, 1923—1927” 
(master’s thesis, University of New Hampshire, 2007), 84.  
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War I and is driven by an ideology that is dominated by an understanding of history and a 
deep appreciation for pragmatism.  
 Most of the published literature that addresses foreign policy during the 1920s is 
either about the decade as a whole, treating the presidencies of Harding, Coolidge, and 
Hoover almost as single entity, or is only about specific international problems and 
places. The best of the books addressing the decade as a whole, is Warren Cohen’s 
Empire Without Tears: America’s Foreign Relations 1921-1933.  Here Cohen offers us a 
concise and well-written account of the time that was “too important to be dismissed as 
an isolationist interlude separating the internationalism of Woodrow Wilson from that of 
Franklin Roosevelt.”6  He goes further by boldly asserting that the “reader will find no 
reference to isolationism in this book” which may shake many who have been told that 
repeatedly about the 1920s.7  The greatest mistake that authors treating this time period 
and Coolidge make is not granting him his own voice. 
When Coolidge actually is discussed there have been many claims over the years 
that he did nothing on the world stage as president. This myth has gone even further at 
times to claim that not just the president, but that the United States of America “also 
withdrew from world politics after 1920.”8  While it is true that this was a calmer period, 
both at home and abroad, than that experienced by many other American presidents, it is 
false to claim that either this nation or the Republican presidents of the 1920s were 
withdrawing from global politics or implementing isolationist policies.  
                                                          
6 Warren I. Cohen, Empire Without Tears: America’s Foreign Relations 1921-1933 (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1987), v.  
7 Cohen, Empire Without Tears, v. 
8 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000 (Portland, OR: Frank Cass), 2000, 3.  
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So, the aim of my thesis is to better understand the foreign policy of the United 
States during the 1920s by making used of the largely untapped voice of Calvin Coolidge 
through the many speeches he wrote while president. Towards that end, this thesis is 
divided into four chapters: the return to normalcy, the molding of the mind, Coolidge 
addressing the world stage, and my conclusion. Chapter One, “Returning to Normalcy,” 
begins with the presidential race and election of 1920 when we see a public rejecting 
Wilsonian ideas and wanting a different approach to the post-war peace. What is “Return 
to Normalcy” and why was it appealing to the American public? How do Harding’s 
approaches to foreign policy differ from those of his predecessor? What kinds of policies 
and issues does Coolidge inherit upon Harding’s untimely death? To discuss these 
previous presidents and the transitions surrounding them, this chapter leans heavily upon 
secondary works about both Wilson and Harding and their foreign policies.  Chief among 
these are: Lloyd Ambrosius’ Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in 
American Foreign Relations, Wesley Bagby’s The Road to Normalcy: The Presidential 
Campaign and Election of 1920, Mark Gilderhus’ Pan American Visions: Woodrow 
Wilson in the Western Hemisphere 1913-1921, Kenneth Grieb’s The Latin American 
Policy of Warren G. Harding, Robert Murray’s The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding 
and His Administration, and Harley Notter’s The Origins of the Foreign Policy of 
Woodrow Wilson.  
The attempted goals of this chapter create a difficult situation for both myself, the 
author, and you, the reader. This is a broad and sweeping narrative that is less about 
arguing something new in regards to Wilson and/or Harding and more about trying to 
provide a deeper understanding of both the domestic and foreign situations their 
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administrations created and what that meant for the problems Coolidge might face during 
his time in office. This lengthy discussion is far more necessary for our discussion of 
Coolidge than other presidential transitions might warrant for at least two reasons. First, 
unlike other instances of presidents dying in office it does not appear that Coolidge held 
the same ambitions to ascend to the highest office as other vice presidents, like Teddy 
Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, certainly had. This alone would have left him far less 
prepared to not only hold the office, but also to take responsibly and initiative on the 
stage of foreign policy. Our understanding the shift from Wilson to Harding, and then to 
Coolidge continuing many policies and actions of the latter, is paramount to our 
appreciation of foreign (and arguably domestic) policy for this time.  
Chapter Two, “Molding of the Mind,” will discuss the origins of the mindset and 
beliefs that will greatly impact the words and actions of Coolidge once he became 
president. Special attention will be paid to his time at Amherst College under the tutelage 
of both Anson D. Morse in United States history and Charles Edward Garman in 
philosophy. In looking at the educational impact of these men we are able to see 
Coolidge’s deep appreciation for the Founding Fathers, especially our first president, 
George Washington, and his understanding of America’s past and purpose. This chapter 
will rely on multiple books that address the teaching of Garman and Morse and how their 
education might have affected Coolidge’s beliefs. Some examples of these include: The 
Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge, Hendrik Booraem’s The Provincial: Calvin Coolidge 
and His World, 1885-1895, Thomas Le Duc’s Piety and Intellect at Amherst College, 
1865-1912, John Almon Waterhouse’s Calvin Coolidge Meets Charles Edward Garman, 
and the Letters, Lectures and Addresses of Charles Edward Garman: A Memorial 
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Volume. These works speak to the nature of Garman, the man that Coolidge spends a 
total of six pages of his 247-page autobiography discussing. As with the final chapter, 
this discussion will rely heavily upon the writings and speeches of Coolidge himself.  
Finally, Chapter Three, “Coolidge Addresses the World Stage” will present and 
dissect the many presidential speeches written and delivered by the president himself on 
issues and stances related to foreign policy. What did he say about war and peace? What 
was his reaction to specific events or problems? To put together the argument of this 
chapter more thoroughly it will be relying most heavily upon the speeches made by 
Coolidge while he was in office from 1923-1929. Most of these are housed in the Everett 
Sanders Papers in the form of machine-readable transcription made available online 
through the Prosperity and Thrift: The Coolidge Era and the Consumer Economy, 1921-
1929 -- Library of Congress. There are also three books that reproduce many of his 
speeches and addresses, though many of them predate his presidential years. Those titles 
include Coolidge’s Foundations of the Republic and The Price of Freedom, as well as 
Calvin Coolidge on The Founders: Reflections on The American Revolution & The 
Founding Fathers, ed. David Pietrusza.  
This examination of Coolidge’s foreign policy through his own words fits into the 
broader narratives and historiography surrounding him by pushing back against most of 
what others have written about him. It does so not by directly attacking the works of 
others, but by showing a side of Coolidge that others have chosen not to and by giving 
him a voice when others would prefer to keep him as “Silent Cal.” While a full 
discussion of this historiography is beyond the scope of our question or concern, it is 
worth our time to briefly discuss the problems inherent in much of the academic and 
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popular scholarship surrounding Coolidge as it is this same group that has largely ignored 
many of these speeches he made while president. That issue is very much our concern.  
One of the few writers to challenge the standard narrative of Coolidge was scholar 
Thomas B. Silver. In his book Coolidge and the Historians, he questioned the way that 
our 30th President was presented, especially by the famous and award winning historian 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who penned the oft-cited history of the 1920s, The Age of 
Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order. Silver argues that well-known historians have not 
done their due diligence on Coolidge and that the “historian is to the politician much as 
the judge is to the lawyer. They both take sides, but the lawyer takes one side from the 
outset and strives with all his might to make it prevail, while the judge takes sides only 
after giving a fair and full hearing to all parties involved.” The conclusion he reaches is 
that Coolidge has never been granted this from those “leading historians” like 
Schlesinger. 9 
However, the problems with the Coolidge historiography seem to go even further 
back than Schlesinger. While he is guilty of relying so heavily on only sources that 
appear overly critical of Coolidge, the problems go deeper than that. Schlesinger, and 
others, have put too much emphasis on the words of three men connected to Coolidge: 
Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, famous newspaper editor and author William 
Allen White, and long-time White House usher Irwin “Ike” Hoover.10 The comment most 
used from Vandenberg is that Coolidge was an unimpressive vice-president who would 
                                                          
9 Thomas B. Silver, Coolidge and the Historians (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1982), 8.  
10 All three men published books that are heavily referenced by historians of Coolidge and the 1920s. 
White had Calvin Coolidge, The Man Who is President (1925) and A Puritan in Babylon: The Story of Calvin 
Coolidge (1938); Hoover had Forty-Two Years in the White House (1934); and Vandenberg had The Trial of 
a Tradition (1926).  
11 
 
 
 
have probably been denied re-nomination.11 The reader, when presented this would likely 
not be surprised to be told that Coolidge would have been equally so as president. 12  
However, the actual passage from Vandenberg, that is rarely quoted or presented in its 
entirety seems to speak differently of Coolidge.  
Death put its tragic hand upon President Harding before his work was done. 
Succeeding him came a quiet, modest, unperturbable New Englander who – while 
so unimpressive as Vice-President that he probably would have been denied re-
nomination even for second place, had his chief survived – has captured the well-
nigh universal imagination of the people in his unruffled, common sense 
dependabilities in the higher station which he now occupies in his own right. The 
character of President Calvin Coolidge partakes the atmosphere of those granite 
hills that gave him birth. He never shirks a rendezvous with duty. He came to 
maturity in a sector of the nation which not only is rich in intimate tradition, but 
also believes in keeping green the laurel of those patriotic memories. It is 
inevitable that all worth tradition in his keeping shall be safe. It is certain that the 
trail will not wander while his compass points the onward press.13 
Vandenberg’s words now seem to carry a much different tune about Coolidge. Instead of 
a man speaking of the terrible political career and outlook of a president we are given a 
passage that appears largely filled with hope and positivity. This presentation of 
Vandenberg’s views is rarely given.  
White presents himself, and is then often misrepresented by historians, as a 
reliable source on Coolidge’s nature and character because he supposedly knew him well. 
However, he only met the man about three times and all after Coolidge had entered the 
White House.14 Certainly White knew of Coolidge but using him as a source of 
something akin to a character witness is perhaps questionable at best. There are parts of 
                                                          
11 Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M., The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Cambridge, 
MA: The Riverside Press, 1957), 57. 
12 Silver, Coolidge and the Historians, 11.  
13 Arthur H. Vandenberg, The Trail of a Tradition (New York: G. Putnam’s Sons, 1926), 396.  
14 Silver, Coolidge and the Historians, 15.  
12 
 
 
 
his works that do carry more weight, such as comments that pertain to observable traits or 
qualities that only contemporaries could bear witness to. Such as how “the impact of his 
Presidential responsibilities had weighted him down” and aged him considerably.15 White 
is also not the only one of Coolidge’s contemporaries to voice concern over his physical 
health. As with the breadth and depth of Vandenberg’s comments, these more useful 
portions of White’s are underrepresented.  
The treatment of Ike Hoover’s comments is usually applied in a similar fashion. 
Schlesinger used them to jump to rather extreme conclusions about the actual amount or 
quality of Coolidge’s work while in office.  
As President, he dedicated himself to inactivity. “No other President in my time,” 
said the White House usher, “ever slept so much.” In his dozen or so waking 
hours, he did as little as possible.16 
Now, commenting about the sleep habits of a president in a positive or negative fashion is 
one thing, but for Schlesinger to take that and conclude that that Coolidge dedicated 
himself to inactivity and did as little as possible while awake is really grasping at straws. 
Reaching those conclusions based on the words of Ike Hoover are disingenuous to both 
reality and the words of Hoover.  
None of this is to say that these sources do not deserve our attention or are 
inherently unreliable. Instead, it is to call for a more complete picture to be offered and 
fairer treatment by historians. Not all of the historians and writers on Coolidge have 
belittled his role generally or in the realm of foreign policy. More recent books like 
Robert Sobel’s Coolidge: An American Enigma (1998), Amity Shlaes’ Coolidge (2013), 
                                                          
15 William Allen White, A Puritan in Babylon (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), 428.  
16 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt, 57.  
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and Charles Johnson’s Why Coolidge Matters: Leadership Lessons from American’s 
Most Underrated President (2013) have at least attempted to provide discussion of issues 
relating to foreign issues. Both Johnson and Sobel offer complete chapters to address 
these concerns and Shlaes attempts to discuss them throughout. While this is an 
improvement over other writings on Coolidge, there is still work to be done, particularly 
in emphasizing and granting the former president a voice in the matter through a greater 
focus on his speeches and writings.  
What does this all mean for our bigger questions about Coolidge’s and America’s 
foreign policy during the 1920s? If we approach those years as a “historical way station 
on the road to the New Deal” and Coolidge’s Presidency as years of inaction then we will 
miss much of the reality of not only Coolidge’s thoughts and actions while President, but 
also this nation’s deep and complex level of global interaction that occurred during those 
interwar years.17 Largely ignoring these foreign interactions and events and trying to 
belittle the character of former presidents by misrepresenting or ignoring sources does not 
change facts. Giving greater voice to Coolidge is one way to start to change this mindset.  
Chapter One: Returning to Normalcy 
The returns for the 1920 election were deafening in their rejection of the 
Wilsonian direction of the country in the post-war years. The Republican candidate, 
Warren G. Harding, took a resounding 16,143,407 votes and 404 electoral votes to 
Democrat James Cox’s 9,141,750 and 127 electoral votes. Even though Harding would 
capture a Southern state for the first time since Reconstruction, the South still went 
                                                          
17 Silver, Coolidge and the Historians, 82.  
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overwhelming Democratic with Cox capturing all of the remaining region plus Kentucky. 
That, however, was not enough to stave off Harding winning by a staggering popular 
majority of 60 percent.18  These numbers and results are impressive, but perhaps the most 
visible rejection of Wilson and the Democrats came in the form of states which had 
shifted their support from Wilson in 1912 and 1916 to the Republicans.19 
 President Woodrow Wilson’s stance that the 1920 campaign should be a “great 
and solemn referendum” on the League of Nations, as well as the Democratic 
convention’s support for the League left their eventual nominee with little room to 
deviate on the issue.20  The result of this stance, and the “partisan controversy” 
surrounding the League since 1919 forced Cox to defend and Harding to attack it.21  In 
many ways this statement from Wilson typified his obsession in the years after World 
War I. His pursuit of both the creation of a League of Nations and America’s 
participation in it seems to have left him ignoring many of the other problems of the 
world. This debate, for or against the League, gave the appearance of an argument for or 
against globalism or nationalism. Few things are this simple and the votes, in Congress or 
the 1920 election, against the League were not, however, calls for isolationism.  
This chapter is unique in that its focus is not on Coolidge exactly. Instead the 
point is to explain the world as it was when Warren Harding’s death forced Coolidge into 
a role he neither expected nor was particularly qualified for, especially in regards to 
                                                          
18 Wesley M. Bagby, The Road to Normalcy: The Presidential Campaign and Election of 1920 (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 159.  
19 Bagby, The Road to Normalcy, 159-160.  
20 Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 43-44.  
21 Bagby, The Road to Normalcy, 134.  
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foreign policy. By looking at the foreign policy decisions of both President Woodrow 
Wilson and President Harding we are able to see their impact on the world and America’s 
role in it, that would affect the choices Coolidge would have to make when he became 
president. It is not the intent or the purpose of this chapter to provide a complete account 
of Wilson’s presidency, the Paris Peace Conference, the 1920 campaign, or Harding’s 
presidency. Instead the focus will always be: what does this mean for Coolidge and the 
world he would encounter? With that focus in mind there are many questions pertaining 
to the years 1919-1923 that can be raised. What is “Return to Normalcy” and why was it 
appealing to the American public? What was the foreign policy of Wilson and Harding? 
What role did the League of Nations debates play in the 1920 election? How does 
Harding’s approach to foreign policy differ from that of his predecessor? What kinds of 
policies and issues does Coolidge inherit upon Harding’s untimely death? These 
questions are pertinent to the 30th President because decisions made in the realm of 
foreign policy usually take time to truly manifest themselves as problems or solutions. 
Choices made by both Wilson and Harding will impact the world Coolidge will face. The 
public’s positive response to the idea of a return to normalcy and other ideas of frugality 
and prosperity under Harding made it easier for Coolidge to step in and continue most of 
those directions, particularly on the home front where changes can and do occur more 
quickly.  
To try and answer these questions we will first discuss what isolationism was and 
how it differs from the non-interventionism that Harding and Coolidge would actually 
emphasize. Then we will briefly look at the foreign policy directions for both Wilson and 
Harding. For Wilson, the focus will be the post-war years and the important debates 
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about the League of Nations. For Harding, we will look at his election and the policy 
decisions that followed. Both men made decisions, good and bad, that would greatly 
impact the world that Coolidge would gaze upon on the morning of August 3, 1923.  
 Isolationism and non-interventionism are far too often confused and misapplied 
by historians and political scientists. Isolationism is a policy that actively resists entering 
alliances, engaging in economic trade with foreign powers, or joining in international 
agreements. The end result is usually a focus upon being economically self-reliant and in 
a constant state of peace as alliances and disputes are aggressively avoided. Many 
scholars believe that the United States was isolationist up through the interwar years, 
including the 1920s.22  America has never actively pursued a true isolationist policy, and 
certainly not during the presidencies of the Republican leaders Harding, Coolidge, and 
Hoover. Under their leadership, attempts were made to not only cooperate with other 
nations, but to better the world through conferences and trade deals. These attempts 
included the creation of pacts to outlaw war, conferences to limit naval armaments, and 
trade deals like the Pan-American agreements. The United States also intervened, 
militarily or otherwise, around the world in an attempt to create or keep political stability 
in foreign nations. Those are not actions of a nation cutting itself off from the world.  If at 
any time in this nation’s history it would seem that isolationist tendencies did show 
themselves, it was during the Great Depression, but that was a necessity based on limited 
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funds, a floundering global market, and a focus on trying to fix national problems in the 
wake of the Stock Market Crash.  
Instead, America traditionally pursued a non-interventionist foreign policy prior 
to 1945. The famous Farewell Address of America’s first President, George Washington, 
is typically pointed to as the starting point for thinking about how to conceptualize our 
nation’s foreign policy. Historian Richard Leopold thinks that Washington’s Farewell 
Address “constituted a foreign policy of independence, not isolationism” that spoke to 
having as limited a political, not economic, relationship with Europe as possible.23  
Independence is the key to non-interventionist ideas as it allows the nation to trade freely, 
resist joining alliances or signing treaties that limit national sovereignty of thought and 
action, and hopefully enjoy years of peace. The freedom of economic trade is a 
component that is missing from isolationist foreign policies, but was actively encouraged 
and pursued by the Republicans of the 1920s.  
While discussions of isolationism in regards to the League of Nations debates and 
the election of 1920 are important, it is imperative to remember that the sides were far 
from strictly Democratic internationalists versus Republican nationalists.24 Historian 
Lloyd E. Ambrosius raises concern over many other historian’s attempts to emphasize 
what they saw as a “negative, partisan, and isolationist role” of the Republicans despite 
that party’s support of what they saw as a positive alternative to the League.25  Perhaps 
historians fail, just as Wilson did, to “appreciate the distinction that [Elihu] Root and 
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other Republicans made between a global system of collective security and an alliance 
limited to Western Europe.”26  This alternative was a proposal made by British Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George that required a pledge by American and British leaders to 
defend France against a future German attack if the French would rescind their demand 
for the ceding of the Rhineland from Germany to France. Wilson agreed to this plan and 
submitted the French security treaty to the Senate on July 29, 1919 but only with the view 
of its existence in conjunction with the League of Nations. His refusal to view the 
alliance as a possible alternative to the League all but destroyed support for this treaty 
from Republicans.27  In the end no agreement could be reached as Republicans refused to 
consider the French security treaty if it was attached to the League, and on the other side 
Democrats refused to support it separately.28  
While the rejection of the League of Nations and general direction of Wilson’s 
foreign policy is important to our understanding of the attitudes and desires of 
Americans, the apparent rejection of Progressivism inherent in Harding’s electoral 
victory is equally as valuable. Historian Wesley Bagby described the absence of 
progressivism in the campaign of 1920 as its “most striking feature” as it had 
characterized both the elections of 1912 and 1916.29 That is to say that the campaign was 
lacking concern over education, regulations, and labor laws. Instead, the focus was on 
jump-starting the economy and trying to avoid the possibility of being dragged into 
Europe’s problems again.  Bagby further claims that to many contemporaries, like 
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Republican William Borah, the “campaign and the election signified the exhaustion of 
the progressive impulse and a consequent movement into reaction” and they would see 
their opinions justified by the “adoption of governmental policies during the next decade 
which seemed designed to facilitate, instead of preventing the exploitation of the 
common man.”30 In the end though, he does not see the election actually halting the 
Progressive Movement. Instead the election simply “demonstrated that progressivism had 
been temporarily submerged during the war in the new social climate that neither 
produced nor supported progressive leaders.”31  While that may be true in regards to the 
election of 1920, historian Robert Murray thinks the absence of progressivism is only 
bolstered by the policies of Harding and then Coolidge, particularly in regards to the 
economics where “the outward signs of prosperity, robbed progressivism of much of its 
relevancy” for the middle and upper-middle classes.32  While the election may not have 
completely halted the movement, the rejection of elements of Democratic domestic and 
foreign policies would allow for Harding’s dominant victory and set the stage for a world 
where the ideas of the Progressive movement would still appear necessary as exploitation 
and suffering would not disappear despite the increased prosperity.  
For Bagby, the World War altered the mindset of the society and “required the 
inculcation of principles contradictory to such philosophic underpinnings of 
progressivism as humanitarianism, the social gospel, faith in the generality of man, 
respect for the individual, and democracy itself.”33  The total impact of the rejection of 
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progressivism is beyond the scope of my argument as its influence affects domestic 
policy to a much larger degree, but the ideals, morals, and customs of the American 
people would shape the direction of the election which would alter foreign policy for the 
next decade. The fact that society was turning away from many of the progressive ideas is 
important because it helps explain part of the support Harding received and in some ways 
how three, distinct Republican leaders were able to win consecutive elections during the 
1920s.  
 Woodrow Wilson’s attempts for creating, in his mind, a more perfect and peaceful 
world in the wake of the First World War offers us a window into many problems that 
plagued foreign policy during his last years in office and in many cases would carry over 
to the next president and beyond. Historian N. Gordon Levin, Jr. describes this effort of 
Wilson, from 1917 forward, to be an attempt to “construct a stable world order of liberal-
capitalist internationalism, at the Center of the global ideological spectrum, safe from 
both the threat of imperialism on the Right and danger of revolution on the Left.”34  
While this is certainly true, his ideas of peace and a new world order were far from 
perfect. The League of Nations debate was at the forefront of everyone’s mind as a peace 
treaty was attempted in the wreckage of Europe.  While it is probably far too simple to 
say that the results of Wilson’s attempts to form the League, and have America lead the 
way into a new future of peace, shaped the election of 1920 and paved the way for 
Republican domination of that decade. It is not unreasonable to point to Wilson’s single-
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minded, obsessive, and internationalist focus as being detrimental in his final years and it 
did certainly put the Democratic party in a tough position for the coming election.  
 While a complete breakdown and analysis of Woodrow Wilson’s ideas on peace, 
foreign policy, and a more perfect world order are beyond the scope of this work, we 
must address the basic beliefs that drove his actions in foreign policy during those years 
between 1917 and 1920. Political scientist and writer Harley Notter breaks Wilson’s 
policy down into three defining elements. The first was morality “which derived from his 
historical studies, his conception of progress, and his social-religious philosophy.” The 
“belief in the capacity and the right of people to rule themselves was another basic 
element.” This second one stemmed from his studies in English and American history, 
the famous writings of statesmen from 18th and 19th centuries, and from his political-
social-religious philosophy. Finally, was the way he conceived of America and her 
mission. In Wilson’s mind, the nation had been founded “upon ideal foundations with a 
singular devotion to the principles of democracy and Christianity and to the well-being of 
mankind.”35  Notter’s intense and detailed research shows that each of these elements of 
thought that defined Wilson’s foreign policy had actually “been determined – and in 
several instances the specific policies built upon them had been formulated – before he 
entered the White House as President.”36 Wilson’s concepts and ideas were clearly well 
developed and deeply affected by his years as a scholar and historian. Like Coolidge, his 
religious faith would also shape his ideas and policies. His years spent as a historian also 
gave him a different perspective on the reception of his ideas and choices. Certainly, 
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while he wanted public approval, in the present, he also very much sought with every 
action to be on the right side of history.  
Months before the Allied powers were victorious, Woodrow Wilson made a 
speech on January 8, 1918 that highlighted his Fourteen Points for European and world 
peace and why victory in the war was necessary.  This speech was made from a mindset 
of a man who felt that he alone held the answer to re-building the globe (especially 
Europe) out of the ashes of a world war. The principles put forth called for many ideas 
like free trade, democracy, and even a certain level of national self-determination to be 
applied to, protected by, and used by the global community.37  For Americans the “most 
important impact that the Fourteen Points had was to engender a fresh environment for 
progressive internationalism and the League.”38   
The importance of this famous speech goes beyond Wilson’s utterance of these 
words and branches out into both the issues surrounding the pursuit of peace at the war’s 
conclusion and the upcoming American presidential campaign. It is also clear that Wilson 
had already taken steps towards pushing the ideas of the League and a new world order 
by himself as “he did not consult the State Department” and only “read the text to 
Lansing the day before he spoke to Congress.” On top of that his private secretary, 
Joseph Tumulty, “knew nothing of the speech until two hours before its delivery” and 
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“three cabinet members learned of it several hours afterward.”39 Wilson saw his path to 
historic immortality and the pursuit had begun. 
The initial steps of Woodrow Wilson at the Peace Conference in 1919 were 
bungled with a series of four tactical errors. All of these miscalculations point to a 
president vastly differing in leadership style and conceptualization of the president’s role 
in comparison to the men who would follow him, including Coolidge. Wilson appears 
fearful to delegate very much responsibility to the State Department and his Secretary of 
State. His actions here also raise questions as to the boundaries of the American president 
– do they have the authority to negotiate peace? Individually, these decisions likely were 
not fatal to the world’s future or Wilson’s legacy. However, as we have seen, the failure 
of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations to create peace and re-build after 
the world war would have dire consequences. Here in the United States, it would directly 
affect the election of 1920 and put Coolidge in a position to ascend to the highest office 
upon Harding’s untimely death. Around the world, tensions would remain high and debt 
would remain a problem even before depression swept the globe.   
Wilson’s first, and likely biggest mistake, was his decision to go to Paris at the 
head of the United States delegation. This was an “unprecedented action” by an 
American president as few men holding that office up to this time had left the country, let 
alone travelled to Europe, for either business or pleasure. Originally Wilson had planned 
on staying in Washington, D.C. as it was “not customary” for the “titular head of state to 
negotiate.”40  Clearly he changed his mind and attended anyway; breaking both custom 
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and historic precedent. However, while this action on Wilson’s part may have been 
unprecedented, but so was the bloody war that he felt warranted it. 
The second mistake was the selection of Paris as the site of the peace conference. 
Ferrell claims that it was chosen to “please the French who had suffered most in the war.” 
Regardless, it was a poor choice though it actually was not the original choice. The plan 
had been to hold it in a neutral state and Switzerland seemed ideal. However, “at the last 
minute Wilson and Lansing threw over the plan” because of rumors about Bolshevist 
propaganda in the country.41 
Third, was the group chosen to represent the United States. This delegation 
consisted of: Colonel Edward M. House, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, General 
Tasker H. Bliss, and the lone Republican, Henry White a retired diplomat. Each man 
carried problems with him to the peace talks. Ferrell called this a “weak” group and 
elaborated on the concerns with each. For House, the problem was his appointment made 
him prominent and he required the ability to work behind the scenes. Lansing had been 
put in the State Department because Wilson desired a figurehead. To make matters worse 
the President was said to have “talked to House for months about how stupid Lansing 
was” and their need to have him replaced. The selection of Bliss appears to have “made 
no sense other than the general’s attendance at the Supreme War Council.” With White, 
Ferrell terms his appointment “absurd” because he “had spent years outside of the United 
states, possessed no importance in the Republican party, and was old and tired.”42  This 
does not sound like a group that would have inspired much confidence and in fact, it 
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comes across as a group that would simply let Wilson get his way and not steal any of the 
limelight he was sure to garner with his visit to Europe. Finally, the fourth problem 
stemmed from the actual convening of the conference. Though not entirely Wilson’s fault 
the bringing together of delegations was haphazard at best, both with the American 
contingent and the other nations involved.43 
All of these errors compounded the concerns surrounding both the Treaty of 
Versailles and the League of Nations. Worst of all for Wilson, the League and the 
Articles of the Covenant were now directly tied to him and his efforts in Paris throughout 
1919. Understanding the outcome of the peace conference and the American rejection of 
the League of Nations offers us another glimpse of the world that Wilson helped shape; a 
world that Coolidge would have to face shortly.  
Two of the non-League issues that arose during the peace talks that would impact 
foreign policy over the next decade were penalties levied against the Central Powers: the 
issue of reparations and the doling out of Germany’s (and the former Ottoman Empire’s) 
colonies. The issue of reparations against Germany would plague international relations 
throughout the next decade and President Wilson had much to do with the bill.44  For it 
was Wilson who pushed the idea of including the cost of Allied military pensions and 
separation allowances into demands for reparations. The United States would also submit 
a claim for additional reparations to cover the costs of the small American army that 
stayed in Germany until 1923. In the end, the conference passed a reparations bill that in 
1921 forced Germany to pay a total of $33 billion, a figure that is staggering considering 
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the financial situation they were in at the time. More than half of that sum was the result 
of pensions. To make matters worse the conference also wrote direct blame for the war 
onto the German’s shoulders. This assertion would deeply affect European politics for at 
least a generation.45 
The breaking up of the former Central Power’s colonial holdings is a bit more 
complicated. Much of it started with the British and French dividing up the Middle East 
provinces of the former Ottoman Empire – Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq – with the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916. The British received the majority of the territory. 
Following that there was a secret treaty between the British and Japanese in 1917 that 
essentially split German Pacific holdings by a line drawn down the equator. This gave 
Japan the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas island groups.46  The effect of these two 
decisions would impact foreign policy and international conflict for decades to come.  
In the end, Wilson with his desire for a particular kind of peace was the focus of 
criticism from American liberals and socialists on the Left and by the Lodge-led 
Republicans on the Right. Those on the Left “argued that the severe terms of the Treaty 
had laid the foundations for another world war” and as radicals they disliked America’s 
involvement in the League of Nations, an organization they saw as being an 
“imperialistic and anti-revolutionary postwar extension of the Entente alliance.” Wilson’s 
critics on the Right approved of the Treaty’s “severity” but sought to keep the United 
States’ “freedom of decision in foreign affairs inviolate” and they opposed the League 
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which they saw as a “device for absorbing American power far too directly into the 
defense of the pro-Allied European settlement.”47 
While debate about the League and the peace treaty dominated much of political 
discussion and policy formation, both at home and abroad, it was not the only concern of 
Wilson in the post-war years. The Russian Revolution posed quite a problem for Wilson 
and his ideology. As the czar was replaced in 1917 he welcomed the initial government 
that took over, but refused to recognize the Bolsheviks who eventually overturned that 
short-lived democratic rule.  Then, in 1918 Wilson ordered a contingent of U.S. troops 
into the regions of northern Russia and Siberia which resulted in fighting between them 
and the Bolsheviks. His refusal of diplomatic recognition of the Soviet state was done 
because he believed “that the Russian people would never accept communist rule.” It 
would appear that Wilson’s stance of non-recognition and his reluctant intervention 
violated the principle of national self-determination regardless of how much he pushed 
anti-Bolshevik policies as essential to ending the war with Germany and creating world 
peace.48  This policy of non-recognition would be upheld by both Presidents Harding and 
Coolidge, though slowly trade between the two will increase despite the governmental 
attitudes.  
The peace conference also failed to reach an agreement on the Russian problem 
and instead chose to basically the avoid the issue.49  Murray asserts that as historians have 
looked back on these events, it is in this failure, among the many perpetrated by the 
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delegates, that resides “the fundamental reason the conference failed.”50  Perhaps this 
statement is less bold if we actually consider the impact that Soviet Russia would hold for 
the world over the rest of the century.  Maybe Wilson and other national leaders had a 
right to fear the Bolsheviks. However, their fears would never materialize into real action 
– military or otherwise.  
The decision to recognize (or not) Turkey, the most powerful player to emerge 
from the crumbling Ottoman Empire in the wake of defeat, was another issue that would 
not be resolved until Coolidge took executive action in 1927 and re-established 
relations.51  While the ideologies were obviously different between the Bolsheviks and 
the Turks, this difference of belief would again form the basis for the United States’ 
policies of non-recognition. Much like Russia, problems arose prior to the end of the war. 
In 1915 a new effort by the Ottomans to suppress the Armenians emerged and anti-
Turkish feelings in the United States grew.52  Diplomatic relations were severed April 20, 
1917 shortly after America declared war against Germany. Despite their severing of ties 
the two powers never declared war against each other. There were tactical and practical 
reasons against such a move as it could have offered a military advantage to Germany, 
caused American troops to fight over a larger area, halted American relief efforts in the 
Middle East, and likely damage to American property in the region.53  Any discussion of 
American and Turkish relations during this period must always return to the questions 
surrounding the Armenian genocide. Historian Simon Payaslian blames Wilson for not 
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being as “strongly committed” to the issues relating to Armenia as he was to the League, 
saying that he “was not prepared to expend much political capital on the Armenian 
question.” Payaslian thinks that Wilson could have provided economic and military aid to 
the Republic of Armenia and her people with little resistance from Congress.54  Oddly 
enough, Wilson’s administration, with its rhetoric of moralism and humanitarianism, 
failed to stop the genocide and instead focused on trying to maintain friendly relations 
with the Turkish government during and after the war. A true peace and diplomatic 
relations with this nation would not return to their pre-war state until late in Coolidge’s 
presidency.  
While Europe and the Old World were the focus of much of Wilson’s foreign 
policy, the concerns of issues closer to home were also important. Revolution and 
political upheaval in Mexico would cause problems for American presidents for over a 
decade. The beginning was the “ouster of the aging dictator” Porfirio Diaz which led to 
the election of Francisco I. Madero whose presidency would not last long. By 1913 he 
had been assassinated as part of a military takeover that saw General Victoriano Huerta 
grab power.  The cycle would continue as a rebellion began amongst northern dissidents 
under the leadership of Venustiano Carranza. This revolt lasted eighteen months and 
“repeatedly confounded” Wilson.55  Just as he wished to avoid military intervention in 
Soviet Russia, Wilson sought other alternatives to a peaceful correction of revolutions in 
Mexico. His attempts surrounded withholding diplomatic recognition and indirectly 
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supporting the removal of Huerta from power.56  The events in Mexico were one of many 
that raised questions about the meaning and application of the Monroe Doctrine in the 
current and future world.57 Relations with Mexico would continue to be a problem for the 
next decade. To ease tensions and try and establish peaceful and beneficial cooperation, 
Coolidge would send multiple ambassadors until one was able to make hopes into 
realities.  
Attempts were made by Wilson’s administration to institute a Pan American Pact 
that would foster “what contemporary social scientists would call ‘regional integration’” 
where “the cultivation of more intimate ties would demonstrate self-evident virtues and 
necessarily would serve mutual interests in peace, prosperity, and security.” Those who 
believed in such ideas of Pan Americanism “presumed the existence of natural harmonies 
in the western hemisphere and reasoned that the creation of a functioning, regional 
system would benefit all participants by facilitating, among other things, the settlement of 
disputes, the expansion of trade, and the diminution of European influences.”58  The 
Great War changed things. Wilson’s focus drifted from Latin America to Europe and the 
rest of the world. There were questions as to whether the Monroe Doctrine could “coexist 
logically” with the Fourteen Points.59 As to this question, there is a belief that they need 
not coexist, instead “his vision of a future League of Nations represented the worldwide 
expansion of the Monroe Doctrine.”60  Towards the end of his presidency there was a 
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clear “tendency to relegate Latin American concerns to a lesser plane” which “produced 
dismay and disquietude over prospects for the future.”61   
One final point bears mention here and it is the issue of the eventual American 
occupation of Nicaragua. Violence and instability in this country highlighted a growing 
concern surrounding the Panama Canal as it neared completion and “American 
investments grew larger in this region.” With this increased presence and the importance 
of the Canal to trade and naval power the stability of the states in Central America and 
the Caribbean became ever more important.62  “Recurrent violence,” like that in Mexico, 
now “endangered national interests.”63  Nicaragua “was close to anarchy” and the United 
States “moved to save it from collapse.”64 Marines would be sent in to prevent “the chaos 
that would result if the factions were left to fight it out for control.”65  They would 
occupy the country for twelve years, from 1912 to 1924 and account for little change. 
Kamman believes it was “still a country unprepared for democracy, with a penchant for 
revolution.”66 Thus would the issue of what to do with Nicaragua carry over to Coolidge 
and he would wrestle with problems of trying to stabilize the country in his own right. As 
we can see, questions surrounding Mexico, Latin America, and Pan Americanism, would 
not die with the League of Nation debates and the thought of expanding the Monroe 
Doctrine. Issues surrounding this region would carry over through the next few 
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presidencies as his actions there “had perhaps caused more controversy there than 
anywhere else in the world.”67  
With this brief summary and analysis of the world Woodrow Wilson envisioned 
and tried to create, we can see how both his successes and failures shaped the world that 
both Presidents Harding and Coolidge would encounter. How did Harding face the 
challenge of stepping into the White House and addressing these and other problems?  
During the campaign of 1920 Warren G. Harding attacked the idea of the League 
of Nations but he was also aggressively targeting the mindset of Wilson and the 
Democratic party in both the domestic and foreign spheres. When thinking about Harding 
and his political ideology it is almost impossible to separate him from the famous idea of 
a ‘Return to Normalcy.’ The speech that brought forth that famous line contains many 
points that speak to his measure of both the nation and the world.  
America’s present need is not heroics, but healing; not nostrums, but normalcy; 
not revolution, but restoration; not agitation, but adjustment; not surgery, but 
serenity; not the dramatic, but the dispassionate; not experiment, but equipoise; 
not submergence in internationality, but sustainment in triumphant nationality.68 
Here we see the phrase surrounded by calls to reject many of the perceived goals of 
Wilson, the Democratic nominee Cox, and even Progressivism. A later statement would 
remove all doubt that Harding rejected notions that legislation or laws would save the 
world from human nature. “The world needs to be reminded that all human ills are not 
curable by legislation, and that quantity of statutory enactment and excess of government 
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offer no substitute for quality of citizenship.”69  Harding cleverly worded his statement to 
go after internationalism and progressivism in one fell swoop. Both held beliefs that if 
problems like war or child labor were allowed to exist unimpeded they were dangerous 
and the only way to fix them and to protect society from itself was to erect barriers in the 
form of laws. Instead of thinking of the world in that fashion, Harding, Coolidge, and 
many Republicans at the time saw more merit in fixing ourselves first, hence the 
reference to there being no substitute for good citizens. Harding would eventually turn his 
‘normalcy’ into an antonym for Wilsonianism through skillful politics and luck, and with 
that “he became invincible.”70 
 Harding never made the attacks personal though as he spoke respectfully of both 
Cox and Roosevelt and called Wilson “one of the most intellectual figures of a century 
and a half” during the campaign. Just as he had secured the nomination it was suggested 
in their strategy meeting that the primary target should be Wilson and not Cox, and 
Harding is said to have responded, “I guess you have nominated the wrong candidate, if 
this is the plan, for I will never go to the White House over the broken body of Woodrow 
Wilson.”71  Pair this potential statement with the way he spoke of internationalism and 
progressivism and you see a man who is willing to attack ideas and beliefs he disagrees 
with, but not the person who holds those beliefs. Harding’s approach fit both the 
campaign and his personality well.  
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 Unlike Wilson, who had tried to take foreign policy directly into his own hands, 
Harding was prepared to let members of his administration perform their assigned tasks. 
President-elect Harding announced Charles Evans Hughes as his secretary of state on 
February 21, 1921 and told reporters that in his administration that questions for the state 
department would go to the secretary of state.72  This was not done because Harding 
lacked anything in regards to foreign policy experience; it could be argued he was one of 
the most experienced presidents in that regard up to this time. He was quite the world 
traveler having first visited Europe in 1907, again in 1909, and yet again in 1911. During 
the 1909 trip he also stopped off in Egypt. In 1911 he traveled to the Caribbean and in 
1915 to Hawaii. Finally, between the election and his inauguration he visited Panama. 
Beyond his travels, he had served as chairman for the Senate’s Committee on the 
Philippine Islands, and been on the Committees on Naval Affairs, Pacific Islands, and 
Territories, and was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee.73  Harding possessed 
a first-hand knowledge of the world and foreign relations that few people were capable of 
at that time.  
The decision to empower his secretary of state in spite of his personal knowledge 
was because he was aware of the complexities of foreign affairs and policy; he was “not 
comfortable in dealing with diplomatic problems.”74   This was a change from Wilson’s 
approach that had resulted in using “[William Jennings] Bryan, [Robert] Lansing, and 
even Bainbridge Colby largely as clerks and kept control of foreign policy in the White 
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House.”75  A deviation from Wilson here further highlights Harding’s sense of an attempt 
to ‘Return to Normalcy’ and trying to re-establish a sense of his belief of what the 
president’s role and power really were.  
Of the many problems left unresolved by Wilson, the most problematic at the time 
and in the long-run probably the most significant was America’s relationship with the 
Soviet Union in the wake of the Bolsheviks’ revolution and rise to power.76  Harding had 
his opportunity to reverse the course set by his predecessor and he chose against it. In 
March of 1921 the Soviets called for a reversal of the non-recognition policy and showed 
a desire for improved relations with the new presidential administration. Not a single 
member of the cabinet supported the move and Hughes spoke out against it. He was not 
the only vocal member as Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, also spoke out 
against any deal with the Soviets. Despite the changes in theory and action from Wilson, 
they still stuck with the approach of the previous administration and refused recognition 
of the Bolshevik government. Why was there support for staying the course? Because the 
“Republicans agreed with their Democratic predecessors about the ideological reasons for 
non-recognition.” Indeed, the vocal Hoover “was convinced of the need to proclaim an 
American ideology, because bolshevism, more than any ideology, threatened American 
individualism, mobility, private property, equality of opportunity, democracy, and 
economic expansion.”77  The issue of Soviet recognition would remain unchanged for 
many more years and continue to be a concern for Coolidge.  
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The Harding administration was more effective in its handling of the Mexican 
situation, another problem inherited from Wilson’s presidency.78  With Mexico there was 
also the issue of recognition stemming from their own series of revolutions. Unlike 
concerns over ideology, the fear was for the safety of Americans and their interests in and 
around Mexico. Before any sort of recognition could be granted they “must sign a pact 
furnishing safeguards” that would offer “assurances against confiscation and 
expropriation, except for public purposes and then only with prompt payment of just 
compensation” and further guarantees protecting private property. They also wanted 
“restoration, where possible, of all that Americans had lost since 1910” and “reciprocal 
guarantees for nationals of either country of freedom to worship.”79  This was presented 
in the form of a treaty that the Mexican government said they would never sign to gain 
their recognition.80  This was the government’s stance from the outset as spokespeople 
consistently said their country “would never buy recognition at the cost of dignity.”81  In 
the end the Americans folded and officially granted recognition on August 31, 1923 
which offered a temporary solution to the tensions with Mexico.82 
There were still other problems in Latin America, many of them hold overs from 
Wilson’s presidency and policies of “overcommitment, stemming from an aggressive 
altruism and a prolonged crusading mentality.”83  The result of this previous mindset left 
Harding’s administration from day one with American troops stationed in the Dominican 
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Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua.84  The ideas of the Monroe Doctrine and Pan 
Americanism which had shaped foreign policy in the region for years still played a large 
role in Harding’s administration as Hughes “was convinced that the Monroe Doctrine 
was essential as part of the foreign policy of the United States and was a cardinal rule of 
self-protection.”85  His belief did not stop there as “the republics of the Western 
Hemisphere must be kept free from encroachment upon their independence and from 
partition by non-continental powers.”86  While Hughes supported the theory he also 
thought it had been abused in the years since 1823 and sought to rectify some of that 
aggressiveness, particularly our interventions and occupations of the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua.87 His plan for pulling our troops out was put in motion 
with the support of Harding and before he left office in 1925 American soliders were out 
of the Dominican Republic, ready to leave Nicaragua, and plans were in place for Haiti.88  
Harding and his administration at least attempted to improve relations with Latin and 
Central American countries despite differences and the carryover of issues from his 
predecessor’s actions.  
The League of Nations debate took a front-seat in the 1920 election and it was 
clear by Harding’s victory that the option of America joining was dead. The proposed 
alternative of Harding never really materialized either. However, there was pressure from 
Hughes for the country to join the Permanent Court of International Justice, which is 
more commonly known as the World Court. Harding had also expressed interest for such 
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a move in his inaugural address.89  Hughes would not press Congress to join the World 
Court until February 1923, where it met stiff resistance in the Senate despite the support 
of the President. There were many concerns over the Court’s relationship with the 
League.90 Progress would be made when the House voted in favor in 1925, but the Senate 
held out until 1926. While they voted in favor they did so with a handful of formal 
reservations. Coolidge would later abandon the proposal in light of these reservations and 
the issue hung around until 1935 “when the Senate again failed to agree to American 
participation.”91 
Wilson, despite his many successes ultimately failed to achieve American 
participation in the League of Nations.  
Of course he failed most unfortunately at the Conference because (1) he does not 
know how to deal with men, (2) he has no idea of team-work, i.e., of how to 
devolve work on others and get them to work with him and each other, and (3) 
because he is a one-idea man, and thought the League of nations would be the 
sovereign panacea for the world’s tragedy which he could not prevent, but a 
repetition of which he hoped might be thereby prevented; and he staked 
everything on its establishment.92 
The failure to delegate responsibility and allow people to do their job was detrimental to 
Wilson’s foreign policy and his singlemindedness towards the League after 1918 (and 
perhaps earlier) was destructive towards not just foreign polices as it neglected other 
global issues, but clearly damaged domestic policies and sentiments which paved the way 
for a Harding victory in the 1920 election.  
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The period of 1921-1923, under Harding, “was one of crisis and readjustment” 
consisting of “years of tremendous economic and social change.” Much of this had 
carried over as Wilson had tried to create and manage the peace. Harding was able to 
steady the ship and create a smooth transition for the nation into a more stable and 
“prosperous peacetime existence.”93  If Harding was good for the country, he was also 
outstanding for the Republican party. They had been out of the White House for eight 
years and seemingly had no policy or program; Harding’s administration would give 
them both.  Whatever thoughts of the ‘normalcy’ program are today, it was successfully 
retained with minor changes by two succeeding presidents, particularly Coolidge who 
won in 1924 with massive public support, where it continued to show its effectiveness. 94 
Clearly the choices, actions, and ideas of Wilson and Harding shaped the world 
that Coolidge would face in 1923. Specifically tensions still existed between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, Mexico, and Turkey over recognition and formal relations. 
Troops were still deployed in a few Latin American and Caribbean nations. Issues still 
stemmed from the peace with Germany and the issue of war reparation and debt from our 
allies and debate over the World Court still raged. The approach taken by Harding in 
rectifying many of the ills of the world would be continued under Coolidge, especially in 
the first year. Much of this grew out of their similar beliefs about the nation, the role of 
the president, and problems with Congress. This would be the world that Coolidge would 
inherit and he would approach its problems with the calm rationality and a sense morality 
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he had gained in his earlier years and under the tutelage of Charles Edward Garman at 
Amherst College.  
Chapter Two: Molding of the Mind 
In the 1960s, a Master’s student named Guy Goodfellow asserted in his thesis that 
“during the Coolidge Presidential years there prevailed a bewildering pace of change. But 
Coolidge’s ideas remained wedded inflexibly to his past.”95 Coolidge’s ideas were not 
stuck in his past, that is in his earlier life; they were firmly attached to the shoulders of 
the Founding Fathers and the great philosophers that came before him. This attachment is 
vividly shown during his years of public service and then in his speeches and actions 
while president. This attachment was also very much thanks to the training of two 
particular professors. 
Most authors and historians who have written about Calvin Coolidge have tried to 
help us understand where he picked up his idealism, beliefs, and tools of rhetoric. 
Usually, emphasis is placed on his time at Amherst College, and for good reason. His 
time there prepared him for his future challenges thanks to the specific teachings of two 
men: Anson Morse and Charles E. Garman.  From these men he received an eclectic 
training in the classics, history, politics, philosophy, and rhetoric, all with a non-
denominational religious focus.96  The ideals and way of thinking that Garman and Morse 
encouraged clearly shaped the mindset of the future president.  
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Calvin Coolidge was not an outstanding student and during his first two years at 
Amherst he felt that despite studying hard he had accomplished marks that “were only 
fair.”97  By his junior year everything changed. His “studies became more interesting” as 
he stepped into the classrooms of Garman and Morse.98 
The influence of Garman’s teaching upon Coolidge can best be summed up in the 
words of the 30th President himself. He considered Garman to be “one of the most 
remarkable men” with whom he had encountered and thought it “difficult to imagine his 
superior as an educator.”99 However, his praise did not stop there: 
We looked upon Garman as a man who walked with God. His course was 
a demonstration of the existence of a personal God, of our power to know 
Him, of the Divine immanence, and of the complete dependence of all the 
universe on Him as the Creator and Father “in whom we live and move 
and our being.” Every reaction in the universe is a manifestation of His 
presence…The conclusions which followed from this position were 
logical and inescapable. It sets man off in a separate kingdom from all the 
other creatures in the universe, and makes him a true son of God and a 
partaker of the Divine nature. This is the warrant for his freedom and the 
demonstration of his equality. It does not assume all are equal in degree 
but all are equal in kind. On that precept rests a foundation for democracy 
that cannot be shaken. It justifies faith in the people.100  
In all, Coolidge spent almost seven pages of his 247-page autobiography speaking to the 
impact of Garman’s instruction upon his life and career.101   
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 Contemporaries were aware of Garman’s importance to Coolidge as well. His 
wife, Grace, spoke of the importance that books played in her husband’s life and 
mentioned the posthumously compiled collection of Garman’s letters and lectures as 
being of considerable value: 
For many years Mr. Coolidge had little time for reading outside that which was 
required in preparing an address, but he was in the habit of reading after he had 
retired for the night. Books mounted in piles upon his bedside table, for he did not 
like to have them disturbed. Among them could always be found his Bible, the 
Life and Letters of Charles E. Garman, the Amherst professor whose influence 
upon his students was so marked, and Paradise Lost in two paper-covered 
volumes. These two small books he frequently carried with him when traveling.102   
This unique tome is of equal importance to us as it was one of the few ways to gain any 
real sense of what Garman was actually like a professor and an intellectual. Unlike Anson 
Morse, Garman did not publish multiple books and aside from this published collection 
compiled by his wife after his death, we know only glimpses and incomplete details of 
how he was able to be so influential to so many. 
Garman employed an educational style that would appear normal to us today, but 
would have been revolutionary at the end of the nineteenth century. In a letter to Amherst 
President Hall, Garman wrote a letter discussing his aims and methods as a professor. He 
described a pamphlet system that he printed at his own expense. These were part of his 
solution to attacking the “unavoidable resistance to new ideas on the part of students at 
this age.”103  These pamphlets were “very fragmentary” and took up a single topic or part 
of a topic and treated it as one would in a lecture. These copies were not given to 
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students; they were loaned with the expectation that they would be returned for the use of 
the next class.104 Garman spoke of the benefits: 
In this way I can state a question without answering it by having them turn over to 
the next chapter of the book and find the answer given there. If I find the question 
is really appreciated, the effort is a success; if not, I must approach it from some 
other direction, by some other pamphlet which shall have enough new material to 
hold their thought and stimulate their inquiry, and yet at the same time focus their 
attention on the problem they have failed to appreciate.105  
This created a different dynamic for the students in the class. Garman felt that if lectures 
were used to any extent they made the students into merely spectators and that by instead 
focusing on pamphlets “they get the lecture before coming into the class room and our 
time is spent in discussion.”106  This methodology was clearly ahead of its time and 
certainly created a memorable experience for Garman’s students as he was exposing them 
to what we think of today as seminar classes or flipped classrooms. While it is unlikely 
that Garman was the only professor at the time to challenge the status quo of lecture 
based courses, it is clear that the experience of this ground-breaking style was effective 
and found useful by his students.  
It is easy to draw straight lines between many of the ideas professed by Garman in 
these types of discussions and those uttered later by Coolidge. This influence was very 
real and there is no better example than the event that propelled him onto the national 
scene and helped him gain the vice presidency. While Governor of Massachusetts, 
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Coolidge faced a crisis that had the potential for nationwide chaos: The Boston Police 
Strike of 1919. 107  Garman opposed such labor strikes: 
When the laborers seek by merely increasing their wages to remove their 
difficulties they are increasing the evils of the times. When the laborers seek not 
to get, but to give, better service, and demand the same of their masters, and ask 
the same of their masters, and ask that manhood shall depend not on wealth, but 
on merit, then a new star, which is the star of Bethlehem, has begun to shine in 
their sky.108 
This passage is important for a few reasons. The first point is that Garman is clearly 
teaching that labor strikes, no matter who is doing them, are wrong. Not only wrong, but 
this act is evil and actually harmful to society. Another key point is the idea of service 
and especially how that act can be applied to better society, even if done in small actions 
like doing one’s job.  
Calvin Coolidge’s Governor’s Proclamation in response to the 1919 Boston 
Police Strike was a heavy-handed piece of front page news: 
There appears to be a misapprehension as to the position of the police of Boston. 
In the deliberate intention to intimidate and coerce the government of this 
Commonwealth a large body of policemen, urging all others to join them, 
deserted their posts of duty, letting in the enemy. This act of theirs was voluntary, 
against the advice of their well wishers, long discussed and premeditated, and 
with the purpose of obstructing the power of the government to protect its citizens 
or even to maintain its own existence. Its success meant anarchy. By this act 
through the operation of the law they dispossessed themselves. They went out of 
office. They stand as though they had never been appointed.  
 Other police remained on duty. They are the real heroes of this crisis. The 
State Guard responded most efficiently. Thousands have volunteered for the 
Guard and the Militia.  Money has been contributed from every walk of life by the 
hundreds of thousands for the encouragement and relief of these loyal men. These 
acts have been spontaneous, significant and decisive. I propose to support all 
those who are supporting their own government with every power which the 
people have entrusted to me.  
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 There is an obligation, inescapable, no less solemn, to resist all those who 
do not support the government. The authority of the Commonwealth cannot be 
intimidated or coerced. It cannot be compromised. To place the maintenance of 
the public security in the hands of a body of men who have attempted to destroy it 
would be to flout the sovereignty of the laws the people have made. It is my duty 
to resist any such proposal. Those who would counsel it join hands with those 
whose acts have threatened to destroy the government. There is no middle ground. 
Every attempt to prevent the formation of a new police force is a blow at the 
government. That way treason lies. No man has a right to place his own ease or 
convenience or the opportunity of making money above his duty to the State.  
 This is the cause of all the people. I call on every citizen to stand by me in 
executing the oath of my office by supporting the authority of the government and 
resisting all assaults upon it. 109 
There are echoes of Garman reverberating throughout that bold proclamation. Coolidge 
highlights concern over those in positions of power, entrusted to them by the people, 
taking actions that likely change nothing and are actually putting innocents in danger. 
This came just a few days after the famous telegram Coolidge sent to Samuel Gompers, 
the President of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), in New York City. This earlier 
message contained much the same beliefs while also highlighted the issue of striking and 
that the dangers of this act for society outweighed anything that the police would gain in 
their selfish attempt. “There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, 
anywhere, any time,” is the famous line that would adorn newspapers around the 
nation.110   
Nothing was guaranteed, but Coolidge’s stance and statements in the face of this 
potential disaster gained him the national spotlight and likely earned him the vice 
presidency. His words and actions echo those concerns and beliefs of Garman and many 
others, to be fair, as he showed a willingness to stand up for what he believed was right 
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despite the potential fallout for his career. Coolidge subscribed directly to ideas professed 
by Garman, but also to a certain mentality and the ability to approach issues both big and 
small. He remembered how, “Garman told his class in philosophy that if they would go 
along with events and have the courage and industry to hold to the main stream, without 
being washed ashore by the immaterial cross currents, they would some day be men of 
power.”111  This ability to stand firm in the face of problems would serve Coolidge well 
as both Governor of Massachusetts and President of the United States.  The fallout of this 
strike happening during his reelection year for governor could have destroyed him if he 
had allowed it to. Instead, he took Garman’s teachings to heart and held to that “main 
stream” thanks to his sense of courage and industry.   
Garman has always received the most attention from historians in terms of 
Coolidge’s intellectual influences, but Morse also had a great impact. Through Morse’s 
class Coolidge gained a deeper understanding and respect for history. The teachings of 
Morse were described as “absorbing” and the lectures on “medieval and modern Europe 
were inspiring, seeking to give his students not only the facts of past human experience 
but also their meaning.”112  There was great emphasis placed on the “political side of 
history” as they discussed Charlemagne to Napoleon.113  Before long their study shifted 
to the United States and Morse “became most impressive.”114 
He placed particular emphasis on the era when our institutions had their 
beginning. Washington was treated with the greatest reverence, and a high 
estimate was placed on the statesmanlike qualities and financial capacity of 
Hamilton, but Jefferson was not neglected. In spite of his many vagaries it was 
shown that in saving the nation from the danger of falling under the domination of 
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an oligarchy, and in establishing a firm rule of the people which was forever to 
remain, he vindicated the soundness of our political institutions. The whole course 
was a thesis on good citizenship and good government. Those who took it came to 
a clearer comprehension not only of their rights and liberties but of their duties 
and responsibilities.115 
The admiration for George Washington would carry over and keep coming up in his later 
speeches. Morse ascribed to the “traditional Whig interpretation of history as a steady 
march of progress and expansion of liberty, from barbarism to civilization.”116   This 
influence could help  explain the reason for some of Coolidge’s ideas that tended to be 
considered more progressive and liberal for the time, especially early in his career where 
he voted for the direct election of U.S. Senators and was in favor of the Women’s 
Suffrage Amendment.117   While Morse and Garman were teaching different subjects it is 
easy to see the overlap in the ideas of service and duties to one’s society coming at 
Coolidge from both directions.   
Just as with Garman we can see Morse’s ideas clearly shine through Coolidge’s 
150th American Revolution Anniversary speeches made while he was president. These 
appearances afforded Coolidge the opportunity to emphasize the importance of those 
moments from 150 years prior and why they still mattered to his contemporaries. In the 
first of these anniversary speeches, Coolidge boldly proclaimed: “Wherever men love 
liberty, wherever they believe in patriotism, wherever they exalt high character, by 
universal consent they turn to the name of George Washington.”118  Now, this speech was 
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made to commemorate the day that Washington took command of the Continental Army 
so it would be easy to discount these statements as simply exalting the man of the hour. 
However, Coolidge does not stop there with his high praise as he brings up the idea of 
posterity and how we might remember great men. He states that we must rank them 
“according to their accomplishment while living” and “the permanent worth of the 
monuments representing their achievements which remain after they are gone.”119  
Leaving Coolidge to conclude that “by this standard I think we may regard George 
Washington as the first lay citizen of the world of all time.”120  Based on those ideas of 
posterity and ranking great men, it is hard to argue against Coolidge’s conclusion. Do we 
not speak boldly of his achievements while living? Do we not memorialize him now that 
he’s gone? Certainly we do with the likes of Washington. Monuments, bridges, towns, 
and roads are named after him, and of course his face etched into the side of a mountain 
with other men we hold in high esteem.  
This was not empty praise heaped upon our first president because the occasion 
called for it. Instead, this manner of speaking about George Washington had occurred 
earlier in Coolidge’s career. Prior to the election of 1920, Coolidge wrote a letter to 
Republican Congressman C. Bascom Slemp of Virginia.  
It was your same great Washington who warned his fellow-countrymen always to 
place America first. He was the first great American who had the vision to see 
that America had the ability to be independent and self-sustaining and who 
believed supremely in the greatness of his own countrymen. This did not cut him 
off from becoming a part of the world or cause him to withdraw the support of 
American from those who might be in need in other lands.  
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For the exemplification of these principles in the present crisis of our country and 
of the world, people are turning toward the Republican party…121 
These earlier words echo similar feelings and ideas about our first president. Coolidge 
does not see the beliefs of Washington necessitating an isolationist feeling or direction 
for the country. However, the important part of this is to see that his statements from 
these anniversary speeches are not empty rhetoric prepared for the occasion. These are 
the views that he has held for many years.  
 In what ways did Coolidge see this greatness in Washington expressed? What 
attributes and ideas did he believe deserve our attention and applause? One of the biggest 
points Coolidge draws attention to is that of Washington being one of the first to speak of 
or envision the colonies as an American nation. That realization made the conflict a 
bigger and more complicated storm than the singular colonies of Massachusetts or 
Virginia could hope to weather alone.122  Coolidge considers Washington to be great as a 
soldier, a statesman, and a patriot beyond those attributes that may be “accorded to any 
mortal.” Saying that “others may have excelled him in some of these qualities, but no one 
ever excelled him in this threefold greatness.”123  
 Washington was more than just a statesman. He was also a soldier and that 
impacted his legacy. Coolidge spoke of Washington’s visit to the Continental Congress 
before they selected a commander in chief. He wore his “Virginia uniform of buff and 
blue” which left some to “ridicule the display of military predilection.” Coolidge saw it 
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differently. In his eyes, Washington’s actions and choice of dress “could hardly have 
been construed as meaning anything other than that its wearer realized what was ahead 
and was willing to force some part of that realization on others.”124  This conclusion of 
Coolidge’s seems to be fair if we assume, like he does, that Washington was making 
calculated moves with both his words, his choice of dress, and his actions. For that is 
exactly what Coolidge sees in this story. That is the fact that Washington “understood, 
and he never underestimated, the political bearings of every move.”125  These speeches 
seem to come from a man who understands and respects the complexity of a past figure 
whose place in the historical conscience seems too often to hang in the balance between 
myth and reality which leaves many people uncertain of where that line is. A statement 
from Coolidge’s radio address on the birthday of Washington sums up this idea best: “It 
is not possible to compress a great life into a single sentence.”126 
 The importance of George Washington to Calvin Coolidge is for at least two 
reasons. Historically, our first president bears our respect and admiration as leading our 
young nation in both a lengthy war and the peace that followed. Personally, for Coolidge, 
the approach that Washington took is the precedent set for his role. The steps taken by 
Washington over a 150 years ago should be studied, understood, and applied to today’s 
problems. These anniversary speeches afforded Coolidge the perfect opportunity to 
remind himself and the people of this nation about those steps.   
Washington was many things and yet his abilities as a soldier do stand out. To 
illustrate this point further, Coolidge brings up a pronouncement that he attributes to 
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Frederick the Great that declared the Trenton-Princeton campaign was “the most brilliant 
military performance of the century.” He follows this up with his own words of praise: 
“For myself, without pretense of military wisdom, the lightninglike stroke of Trenton and 
Princeton in its supreme audacity and ideal execution has always seemed the most 
perfectly timed combination of military genius and political wisdom that we find in the 
records of warfare.”127  Yet, in another speech, Coolidge claims that “it can not be said 
that this ranks as a great battle.”128  While his tune has changed slightly, he does not 
discount the events at Trenton entirely as he continues with saying that it “was the 
turning point in the Revolutionary War at which defense and defeat became offense and 
victory.”129  I think both of these statements hold great truth and it is fascinating to see 
him attack the question of Trenton from two different angles. The first is taking place in 
an attempt to argue in favor of the selection of George Washington to lead the 
Continental Army. The second is uttered in celebration of the success of Trenton and 
Princeton. With those thoughts in mind those two quotes describing the same event 
appear not to be disagreeing but instead to be different sides of the same coin, one being 
used to praise a great man and the other to celebrate the event Coolidge sees as the 
turning point of the American Revolution.  
Towards the end of one of those celebratory speeches Coolidge highlights the 
principles of conduct that Washington offered in his Farewell Address. The points he 
draws out are that of valuing honesty, believing in our fellow man, cherishing no 
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resentments, harboring no hatreds and forgiving our enemies. In Coolidge’s eyes 
Washington also made it clear by his argument that cooperation is the key to both 
progress and peace.130  Why do these principles of conduct matter so much to Coolidge? 
Because for him:  
The world has not outgrown, it can never outgrow, the absolute necessity 
for conformity to these eternal principles. I want to see America assume a 
leadership among the nations in the reliance upon the good faith of 
mankind. I do not see how civilization can expect permanent progress on 
any other theory. If what is saved in the productive peace of to-day is to be 
lost in the destructive war of to-morrow, the people of this earth can look 
forward to nothing but everlasting servitude. There is no justification for 
hope. This was not the conception which Washington had of life.131 
Washington was more than just our first president for Coolidge. He saw him as the first 
American, a great soldier, a strong statesman, and the one that offered the secret to a 
better future.  Despite the ever changing world, Coolidge is stating that living by ideals 
and principles laid down over a hundred years ago, we can have the good that we seek in 
the world. Through this pursuit we can have peace, hope, and prosperity. Coolidge 
appears to see it as his duty to bring these principles out of the past and into the present to 
guide the American people, and the world, into a more peaceful and prosperous future.  
 John Adams, of Massachusetts, is praised by Coolidge for being the one to 
present Washington’s name to the Continental Congress for consideration as commander-
in-chief. He says that we can thank Adams for Washington and for John Marshall being 
Chief Justice and that “destiny could have done no more.”132  This is one of the few 
moments that Coolidge mentions another Founding Father by name. While Adams could 
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not have been the only one rooting for Washington and Marshall, his ability to see what 
others could not and support both of those men seems important to Coolidge.  
 Not all of Coolidge’s focus on Washington can be brushed off as mere hero-
worship for he does mention the human qualities of failure and set-backs that he had to 
overcome during the course of his life, particularly during the American Revolution. For 
example, he correctly stated that, even with Washington in command “the struggle [the 
American Revolution] was well-nigh lost at several periods.”133 That is to say, even with 
George Washington in command, even with the victorious crossing of the Delaware, the 
war and independence were far from guaranteed.  
In his discussions of the American Revolution it is sometimes easy to get lost in 
his heaps of adoration for Washington and lose sight of his “so-what” in regards to why 
we as his contemporary countrymen should still care about the events of the late 1700s – 
namely the war for independence. There is always a political message within these 
speeches, as one would expect from a presidential address, but there is certainly an 
applicable and tangible “so-what” in regards to the present and future being employed. At 
the end of his speech commemorating George Washington taking command of the 
Continental Army, Coolidge draws parallels between that distant past, the recent horrors 
of World War I, and the future he hopes to see: 
The world has tried war with force and has utterly failed. The only hope of 
success lies in peace with justice. No other principle conforms to the 
teaching of Washington; no other standard is worthy of the spirit of 
America; no other course makes so much promise for the regeneration of 
the world.134 
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Coolidge follows this up by calling out the “Old World” – i.e., Europe – and asking the 
crowd listening to his words to reject a desire to get caught up in the problems of those 
nations across the ocean like they had done recently in the chaos of a world war.    
Coolidge sees Washington and the other Founding Fathers as having forged ideals 
and principles out of the fire of the American Revolution. Those ideals and principles 
come in many forms. They were written in famous documents like our Declaration of 
Independence and Constitution. Coolidge sees great merit in another form of sharing 
ideals and principles: action. The greatest case of this was the Revolution itself. For 
“Washington and the patriots of his day wanted peace,” and yet “they found it was 
necessary to make great sacrifices in order to secure it.”135  There is a lot going on in that 
statement from Coolidge. We are hearing strong rhetoric that, placed in the context 
around it, is defending a “just” conflict. Yet, as we have seen from other speeches he is 
very much in favor of peace. A moment like this, celebrating a battle that was a turning 
point of a great conflict, is a perfect moment to both defend engaging in battle and 
decrying the bloodshed.  
The idea of the American work ethic is a common talking point for many 
politicians, motivators, and educators when discussing the success of the American 
colonists and those in the early Republic. This is a virtue that the hard-working masses 
are supposed to be able to get behind in support. Mere brawn and muscle are not the only 
way for that work ethic to shine through, however. Instead, it is only thanks to the 
“development of our natural resources, our inventive genius, and mechanical skill this 
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Nation has become possessed of very large wealth.” The knowledge of how to exploit 
natural resources, invent wonderful machines, and make them work for us is a key to our 
success in Coolidge’s mind. This work ethic is not fool proof either. It can be dangerous 
as in “past history it has usually led first to luxury and ease and later to decline and 
decay.” 136  Coolidge did not believe they had yet reached that point of complacency or 
idleness but speaks of being ever vigilant.  
The fascinating points he makes about the value of work do not stop there. He 
proclaims that: “Prosperity is not a cause; it is a result.”137  It is a result of all of those 
virtues, principles, and ideals that trace all the way back to the “First American” – 
George Washington – and the Founding Fathers. Coolidge refuses to see the bad that can 
also exist in prosperity. For him it is not “based on indolence and ease, on avarice and 
greed, or on selfishness and self-indulgence.” Instead, “it is the result of industry, fair 
dealing, self-denial, and generosity.”138  Those positive aspects are summed up for him in 
the word “character.” He also believes that if we place trust in the process and put these 
virtues into practice every day our prosperity will only grow greater. He concludes that 
thought with a profound statement: “A more efficient service, one to another, will be the 
foundation of a greater prosperity and of a stronger national character.”139  This is not 
important simply because it is telling us we will become richer and better people for 
treating our neighbors properly. Instead it is profound because it echoes the deliberations 
of a Founding Father not named Washington, namely Alexander Hamilton. Simply put, 
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Hamilton as our nation’s first Secretary of the Treasury argued that the key to 
successfully creating both a powerful economy and a strong central government must be 
achieved by linking the wealthy’s interests to the fate of the national government.140  So 
we see in Coolidge’s speeches a certain harkening back to the ideals, principles, and 
beliefs of many of the American Founding Fathers. Even more than that, we see Coolidge 
taking and applying those key points towards motivating and inspiring his contemporary 
Americans for their present and their future.  
As a highly religious man, Coolidge is also fairly quick to bring aspects of faith 
into the discussion of the American Revolution. While we know he attended the 
religiously grounded Amherst College, his exposure to religion started much earlier. For 
Coolidge’s family, particularly his grandparents, both the Bible and church played a role 
in their daily lives. In his autobiography he specifically points to two moments this 
exposure manifested itself. The first was during his grandfather’s illness where he would 
have young Coolidge “read to him the first chapter of the Gospel of John, which he had 
read to his grandfather.”141 The second being his family’s role in the local church.  
For most of the time during my boyhood regular Sunday school classes were held 
in the church which my grandmother Coolidge superintended until in her 
advanced years she was superseded by my father. She was a constant reader of the 
Bible and a devoted member of the church, who daily sought for divine guidance 
in prayer.142  
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This grandmother was important for the young Calvin as he “stayed with her at the farm 
much of the time and she had much to do with shaping the thought of my early years.”143 
This religious upbringing showed itself in the speeches by where his focus and 
choice of words would often go. In one key passage he actually compares Philadelphia 
(Independence Hall particularly) to the Holy Land:  
It is little wonder that people at home and abroad consider Independence 
Hall as hallowed ground and revere the Liberty Bell as a sacred relic. That 
pile of bricks and mortar, that mass of metal, might appear to the 
uninstructed as only the outgrown meeting place and the shattered bell of a 
former time, useless now because of more modern conveniences, but to 
those who know they have become consecrated by the use which men 
have made of them. They have long been identified with a great cause. 
They are the framework of a spiritual event. The world looks upon them, 
because of their associations of one hundred and fifty years ago, as it looks 
upon the Holy Land because of what took place there nineteen hundred 
years ago. Through use for a righteous purpose they have become 
sanctified.144 
There are many fascinating threads of mythological and rhetorical construction running 
through this series of statements. First off he’s asserting that people do see Independence 
Hall as hallowed ground, that people, both Americans and foreigners, see a divine 
purpose in what happened there 150 years ago. It is also worth noting that this statement 
is made during a speech in celebration of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. 
Why is that noteworthy? Because this passage is clearly going beyond that singular 
moment and referencing every moment of Independence Hall’s role in our nation’s 
founding. That is why he thinks people see each of those bricks and that shattered bell as 
being sanctified relics of the holy purpose of controlling one’s destiny. Coolidge sees the 
Declaration as an inspiration that transcended our own borders as it should be “regarded 
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as one of the great charters that not only was to liberate America but was everywhere to 
ennoble humanity.”145  Now it is easy to see Coolidge’s earlier connection completed: 
Philadelphia’s Independence Hall is hallowed ground because like Christ, the American 
Founding Fathers sacrificed and suffered to show humanity the way to a free, virtuous, 
and prosperous life with their words and actions.  
 The religious connections to the Declaration of Independence do not stop there for 
Coolidge. However, he does briefly shift his discourse away from those religious 
connotations to address the more temporal influences upon that document. He spends a 
few pages going into a discussion about the important ideas put forth by this Declaration 
and then comes to some startling conclusions that it is not the ideas themselves which are 
amazing, but it was that “a new nation was born which was to be founded upon those 
principles and which from that time forth in its development has actually maintained 
those principles, that makes this pronouncement an incomparable event in the history of 
government.”146  There would appear to be something to this conclusion as this belief is 
far from new. Coolidge downplays the importance of French thought to the ideas 
contained in our Declaration saying: 
It is generally assumed that French thought had some effect upon our 
public mind during Revolutionary days. This may have been true. But the 
principles of our Declaration had been under discussion in the Colonies for 
nearly two generations before the advent of the French political 
philosophy that characterized the middle of the eighteenth century.147 
It is quite interesting that Coolidge only mentions French philosophers here. Is he simply 
ignoring the likes of other European philosophers like John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, 
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Adam Ferguson, and David Hume or is he simply discounting their influence? Either 
choice would appear odd. Simply discounting the importance of European thought to our 
end result would have likely sufficed and yet he specifically called out the French, our 
ally in independence. The reason that this line of thought would makes sense is that it 
would play into his bigger point that these ideas had a home in many colonial pulpits 
since as early as 1638 when Rev. Thomas Hooker, of Connecticut, asserted two big 
points in a sermon to the General Court. First that “the foundation of authority is laid in 
the free consent of the people,” and second, that “the choice of public magistrates belongs 
to the people by God's own allowance.”148   While these ideas are not necessarily 
religiously-oriented, they do find themselves emanating from a religious person and 
place. For much of New England, especially in the time Coolidge is discussing, ideas of 
religious faith permeated every corner of society.  There are certainly some echoes of the 
future Declaration in the words of Hooker. Namely that government gains its power and 
legitimacy from the people, morally upstanding people. Coolidge’s dismissal of the 
impact of European philosophy upon our ideas of freedom, justice, and equality is a 
seemingly odd stance to make even if one wants to believe the Declaration of 
Independence is a reflection of exceptional thoughts and ideals with a decidedly 
American origin.  
 Deviating from the questions of origins of the ideas, Coolidge reasserts the 
religious importance of this document:  
In its main features the Declaration of Independence is a great spiritual 
document. It is a declaration not of material but of spiritual conceptions. 
Equality, liberty, popular sovereignty, the rights of man--these are not 
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elements which we can see and touch. They are ideals. They have their 
source and their roots in the religious convictions. They belong to the 
unseen world. Unless the faith of the American people in these religious 
convictions is to endure, the principles of our Declaration will perish.149 
There is great clarity surrounding Coolidge’s belief in the spiritual and physical necessity 
of adhering to these ideals. This is getting so much attention because his faith and his 
trust in that belief shines through so clearly in these last few pages of this speech. He 
believes that all things go back to that faith in God – our freedom, our Constitution, our 
prosperity, and even ourselves. This mindset will manifest itself advocating and actively 
supporting democratic ideals and freedom throughout the world, albeit less aggressively 
and one-sided as Woodrow Wilson had tried.  
Coolidge exclaims in concluding fashion that our Declaration is the “product of 
the spiritual insight of the people.” He warned those listening that they lived in an age of 
great scientific knowledge and wealth which did not create the Declaration. Instead those 
things are the product of that document. That if we fail to cling to things of the spirit that 
“all our material prosperity, overwhelming though it may appear, will turn to a barren 
scepter in our grasp.”150  This in a way harkens back to his belief that prosperity is a 
result. Specifically, a result of our belief in the values, morals, and principles left behind 
by our Founding Fathers.  
There were many moments in which Coolidge would masterfully summarize the 
role or briefly state the importance of the American Revolution in rhetorically rich 
statements. An example of this is when recklessly stating that it “represented the 
informed and mature convictions of a great mass of independent, liberty loving, God-
                                                          
149 Coolidge, Declaration of Independence, 29-30.  
150 Coolidge, Declaration of Independence, 39. 
61 
 
 
 
fearing people who knew their rights, and possessed the courage to dare to maintain 
them.”151  As with many of his rhetorically striking statements this one overgeneralizes 
and makes a lot of historically questionable assumptions, like education levels, economic 
freedom, and even literacy rates of that great mass.  
Coolidge believes that Washington and the Americans were successful in winning 
their fight for independence because they believed in their cause and their cause was just. 
Here is one of the many times that he quotes a historical figure in a speech, as he uses a 
line from a letter that Washington wrote to his brother speaking of “the full persuasion of 
the justice” of their cause. On the other side of that conflict, it was also the final 
realization for the British, “that their cause was not just that led them to abandon their 
attempt to subdue the Colonies.”152  Here we see his almost otherworldly admiration for 
Washington combining with his belief that this American Revolution was actually a 
spiritual crusade to create the illusion of this conflict having been the proper course of 
action, not because men thought of it as such, but because it was right in the eyes of God. 
This like other parts of his speeches is trying to justify the actions of the past while also 
elevating our Founding Fathers to another level of thought, belief, and action.  
These ideas are carried over into Coolidge’s speech made in celebration of 150 
years since the first meeting of the Continental Congress in Philadelphia. His speech 
deviates from simply discussing that first meeting, but instead takes off from there and 
shifts to the importance of that moment being the beginning of a long and arduous 
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process that results in our Constitution. 153  That document and our success as a nation has 
led to its adoption “as the fundamental law for republics in every quarter of the world.” 
With its influence able to be “traced in every constitution on earth, from China to Peru, 
from the Australian Commonwealth to the German Republic.”154  This is placing the 
importance, the “so-what”, of that first meeting into the context of how it affects them in 
1924. Not just his contemporary Americans either. The result of the process that started 
in that first gathering in Independence Hall has changed the world. For him, it altered the 
Founder’s present and future, it altered the future that Coolidge himself resided in, and he 
argues it altered the very course of human history.  
This idea behind the words “power of the people” is constantly brought up by 
every freedom loving American and Coolidge is no exception.  One of the final points he 
makes there in regards to the Constitution is that it deserves more praise for showing the 
power of the people. For this document was the result initially of a voluntary effort on the 
part of the people to “redress their own grievances and remedy their own wrongs.”155  
There are many levels to this thought. The first being that all or many people in the 
former colonies came together to make that happen. Perhaps there is truth to that at a later 
point, but the American colonists were far from united at this juncture. The second is 
slightly more profound as Coolidge is forwarding the idea that people, collectively and as 
individuals, hold great power. Alone, that statement is only so powerful. If you combine 
it within the context of many other statements we have examined, it can be seen as a 
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warning against deviating from the principles and ideals that have led to America’s 
prosperity. Deviating as an individual could be damaging, but deviating as group of 
individuals, as the Founders did, changes the course of human history.  
As we have seen there are many levels of rhetoric, history, and truth to the 
speeches Calvin Coolidge made to commemorate the 150th Anniversary of the American 
Revolution. These speeches showed an awareness, historical and otherwise, to the 
complexity of greatness and patriotism. Washington is presented as an outstanding 
example of what all American should and can strive to be. Sometimes we can learn just 
as much from someone by looking at what is not said by them. In the case of Coolidge, 
we do not hear him praise any other Founding Father to the extent he does with 
Washington. His assertion that it was due to John Adams that we even had Washington as 
commander-in-chief of the Continental Army (and eventually as our first president) and 
John Marshall as Chief Justice is about the most we get beyond comments made in 
passing about others. There is something to that. Coolidge’s plan for these speeches is 
fairly clear: there would be a focus on Washington, the Declaration and Constitution, and 
why those still mattered in the mid- to late-1920s. This is a sound strategy and we cannot 
help but assume that those were also the important pieces of those arguments. That is not 
to say that those lines of thought were not politically motivated, but that perhaps those 
principles he spoke so highly of were actually part of what motivated him.  
The mind of Coolidge was clearly shaped and directed by the teachings of those 
two great educators from his time at Amherst College. From Garman we can see his 
sense of rationality and unwillingness to overreact to a potential crisis. This influence was 
not just in a general sense either, as we can clearly pick up specific points carrying over 
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from Garman’s views on strikes and labor problems in the handling and response of 
Coolidge in Boston during 1919. While Garman gets the attention from historians and 
writers, Morse deserves a certain level of praise too. The political views of Morse offered 
a framework for the application of ideas learned previously and Coolidge’s love of 
history seems to have only grown from this educational experience. Garman helped 
Coolidge understand how to think and how to apply that to all walks of life and Morse 
helped him understand the complexity of politics and how to frame think about history 
and its importance in the past, present, and future. Now it time to see Coolidge apply 
these traits, ideals, and beliefs to the problems of the world. The problems that we saw in 
Chapter One that were created, avoided, and exacerbated by the presidents that came 
before him.  
Chapter Three: Coolidge Addresses the World Stage 
It was early in the summer of 1927 and two men sat down for lunch. One of them 
was President Calvin Coolidge and the other was Colonel Raymond Robins. The 
mealtime conversation quickly turned to the question of outlawing war.  
“Mr. President,” said Robins, “you have immortality lying all around you in this 
proposal to outlaw war and you are doing nothing about it.” 
“Well,” replied Coolidge, “the people are not interested in that proposition; they 
probably think it is impractical.”  
“They ought to be interested,” countered Robins, “and it is practical, and I 
understood you were for it when I was campaigning for you in 1924.” The issue was 
pressed until the President would discuss the possibility of trying to outlaw war with 
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Secretary of State Kellogg.156  The chance to outlaw war, if such a goal is possible, 
showed itself in what would become the Kellogg-Briand Pact. We will discuss this pact 
and Coolidge’s responses to it later. For now, let us understand why this exchange 
embodies much of our 30th president’s ideas on foreign policy.  
As we saw in Chapter Two, the man that would become president was prudent, 
thoughtful, and strong in his convictions. These traits shine through in that exchange with 
Robins where he is seemingly unconcerned with the personal glory that could be gained 
by being the president to outlaw war. Public opinion is not necessarily the only factor in 
his stance, but it is clear that he is concerned with the will of the people.  
The most obvious, though unspoken, point is that he saw this as not being his 
battle or role. That is, he believed in his Secretary of State to do his job and that job was 
to deal with foreign policy and issues like this one. Delegating duties and expecting those 
placed in or voted into positions of power to do their job were key points to the way that 
a Coolidge-led government would function. If you were unable to do your job you would 
be replaced, as he did by sending Dwight Morrow to replace James R. Sheffield as the 
United States Ambassador to Mexico starting in 1927. There were actually three different 
ambassadors appointed to Mexico by Coolidge between March 1924 and October 1927. 
Finding the right fit for the job was important as relations between our two countries 
were tense. Luckily, this appointment of Morrow was a successful attempt to shift the 
countries away from potential conflict, military or otherwise. 157   
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This understanding of roles is important to our discussion of Coolidge. His ideas 
of federalism and the role of the president affects everything his administration did – 
from domestic to foreign policy. While “Governor of Massachusetts, Coolidge supported 
wages and hours legislation, opposed child labor, imposed economic controls during 
World War I, favored safety measures in factories, and even worker representation on 
corporate boards.” Yet, as president he did not support these same issues because “in the 
1920s, such matters were considered the responsibilities of state and local 
governments.”158  His ideas had not changed, only his role and position had.  
Calvin Coolidge made dozens of speeches while president from 1923-1929. These 
speeches represent a vast untapped resource for historians to shatter the long held 
preconceptions about Coolidge’s person and presidency. What did he have to say about 
foreign policy? What did he have to say about the issues of war, of peace, and of 
interactions with other nations? In the portrayal of Coolidge as a silent man most 
historians and writers have largely ignored these speeches. As with his thoughts on 
George Washington, the American Revolution, and the importance of history to his 
contemporaries, these addresses contain nuanced arguments and points that show a man 
who was deeply invested and concerned with the world around him. By examining these 
speeches, we can explore their common themes and see how he responded to the world’s 
problems – those that carried over from the Wilson and Harding presidencies and those 
new concerns.  
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During the last formal address that Coolidge would make during the 1924 
campaign he outlined the direction and mindset that his administration’s foreign policy 
would take.  
We have a well-defined foreign policy known of all men who will give it candid 
consideration. It has as its foundation peace with independence. We have 
abstained from joining the League of Nations mainly for the purpose of avoiding 
political entanglements and committing ourselves to the assumption of the 
obligations of others, which have been created without our authority and in which 
we have no direct interest. Under our Constitution we cannot, by treaty pledge or 
limit the future action of the Congress. But we have not refused to help, we have 
not refused to cooperate, we have not refused to act, whenever circumstances 
have arisen under which we could render assistance.159 
  
Coolidge speaks to an approach that leaves American autonomy intact while not refusing 
to participate in conferences or offer aid and assistance when the situation requires it.  
War is a common theme among Coolidge’s speeches. Despite his focus on the 
warrior and the militaristic attitudes required when discussing such events, he spoke just 
as much about the idea of peace. At the end of his speech commemorating George 
Washington taking command of the Continental Army, Coolidge draws parallels between 
that distant past, the recent horrors of World War I, and the future he hopes to see: 
The world has tried war with force and has utterly failed. The only hope of 
success lies in peace with justice. No other principle conforms to the 
teaching of Washington; no other standard is worthy of the spirit of 
America; no other course makes so much promise for the regeneration of 
the world.160 
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This harkening back to the Founding Fathers, and George Washington specifically, is 
also a common theme in his speeches. Towards the end of that same celebratory speech 
Coolidge highlights the principles of conduct that Washington offered in his Farewell 
Address. The points he draws out are that of valuing honesty, believing in our fellow 
man, cherishing no resentments, harboring no hatreds and forgiving our enemies.161  
In Coolidge’s eyes Washington also made it clear by his argument that 
cooperation is the key to both progress and peace.162  Why do these principles on conduct 
matter so much to Coolidge? Because for him:  
The world has not outgrown, it can never outgrow, the absolute necessity 
for conformity to these eternal principles. I want to see America assume a 
leadership among the nations in the reliance upon the good faith of 
mankind. I do not see how civilization can expect permanent progress on 
any other theory. If what is saved in the productive peace of to-day is to be 
lost in the destructive war of to-morrow, the people of this earth can look 
forward to nothing but everlasting servitude. There is no justification for 
hope. This was not the conception which Washington had of life.163 
In another speech he again asserts this relationship between Washington and peace by 
saying, “Washington and the patriots of his day wanted peace.”164  It should be no 
surprise then that Coolidge would adopt, at least on paper, such a non-interventionist 
attitude toward foreign policy as the idea of leaving Europe to her own devices and 
focusing on home was a major point of Washington’s Farewell Address. The cries for 
peace were loud in the shadow of a devastating world war that still hung over the world 
and despite the distance that United States held from the worst of it. Certainly this public 
hope for peace contributed to Coolidge’s actions, but he showed no grand ambitions for 
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world domination or national expansion. Intervention, of any kind, under Coolidge was 
relatively sparse and seems to have only occurred in countries, like Nicaragua, where an 
American military presence had previously been exercised. This small flexing of the 
military’s muscles was supposedly used to protect American nationals and their interests, 
like business ventures in Latin/Central America and elsewhere, and the vital Panama 
Canal for trade.  
 Not all of his discussions of war are focused on Washington and the Founding 
Fathers though. More often than not, his focus returns to the idea of peace. When 
dedicating the Liberty Memorial in Kansas City, Missouri, on November 11th, 1926, he 
said of the monument that it “has not been raised to commemorate war and victory, but 
rather the results of war and victory, which are embodied in peace and liberty.”165   It 
should be obvious by this point that Coolidge’s mention and use of war is perhaps a 
superficial vehicle of opportunity for him to reach his important points on peace. Every 
one of the speeches he makes at monument dedications or in celebration of some past 
victory branches into Coolidge trying to sell peace to the American people. The public 
was a willing buyer of these ideas as a large contingent of Americans had been calling for 
peace since 1915.166 
 The religious side of Coolidge’s world view also shines through in most of his 
speeches. Discussions of war and foreign policy concerns were not exempt from such 
language either. “It is not only because of these enormous losses suffered alike by 
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ourselves and the rest of the world that we desire peace, but because we look to the arts 
of peace rather than war as the means by which mankind will finally develop its greatest 
spiritual power.”167  This followed him addressing the concern over losses that this nation 
suffered in the Great War – both in terms of money and human life.168  However, his 
broader point is that mankind must fundamentally improve and that they must seek peace 
or perish.  
 This concern over loss speaks to a bigger issue of how much it actually costs 
nations to go to war and deserves more of our attention. Wasting money was always a 
concern of Coolidge, even when it was not his own. This concern takes two forms in his 
speeches. The first is that militaries cost money to operate in both war and peace. Saying 
that “like everything that has any value, the Army and Navy cost something. In the last 
half dozen years we have appropriated for their support about $4,000,000,000.”169  
Remember that the last half dozen years, as of this speech in 1926, were the first six years 
of the peaceful, prosperous “Roaring Twenties” when things appeared to be great for 
many Americans. This is without taking into account the second form of the financial 
costs that wars place upon a nation: pensions and death gratuities. These are the long-
term costs that a country must bear many years after a war has concluded. The first of 
these pays for the retirement of living soldiers after their service and the other provides 
funds to the soldier’s surviving family to lighten the financial burden immediately 
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following the death, but prior to any potential survivor benefits starting.170 Coolidge 
addressed this problem when speaking at Gettysburg Battlefield: 
The respect in which the United States holds its service men is indicated 
by something more substantial than lip service. Between $6,000,000,000 
and $7,000,000,000 have gone out of the United States Treasury in 
pensions and gratuities to those who fought in that war which reached its 
crest upon this hard-fought field. These payments are still going on at the 
rate of about $200,000,000 each year. To the account of those who took 
part in the World War, for benefits and compensations in the short period 
of 10 years since its close already there has been set aside almost 
$5,000,000,000, and payments are going on at the rate of about 
$560,000,000 each year. Our people do something more for their service 
men and their dependents besides giving them a kind word while they live 
and placing a wreath on their last resting place when they are gone.171 
Now, he is certainly not blaming the individual solider for the cost that they force the 
nation to bear. Coolidge’s purpose is instead multifaceted in that he is trying to make that 
point that Americans have and always will respect those men who place themselves in 
harm’s way when the Nation asks that of them. The other side of that is the cost in capital 
– human and otherwise. The specificity with which he makes his argument shows the 
importance that money holds.  
Coolidge is not blind to the fact that many great attributes of human character 
shine in times of war either. 
We know that discipline comes only from effort and sacrifice. We know 
that character can result only from toil and suffering. We recognize the 
courage, the loyalty, and the devotion that are displayed in war, and we 
realize that we must hold many things more precious than life itself. But it 
can not be that the final development of all these fine qualities is 
dependent upon slaughter and carnage and death. There must be a better, 
purer process within the realm of peace where humanity can discipline 
itself, develop its courage, replenish its faith, and perfect its character.172 
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This is one grand statement about his ideas on character building within which we can 
see the culmination of his religious upbringing, his years at Amherst, and the evolution of 
his ideas on peace coming together. Here he is telling the crowd gathered in Kansas City, 
Missouri that the bravery, the courage, and all of the other attributes we praise in times of 
war have to be found through other avenues if we are ever to have any sort of lasting 
peace. Coolidge is pushing a fascinating conclusion here: for the world to know peace, 
we must find a way to grab onto those ideas and characteristics in times of peace in an 
attempt to ward off our desire to find them only in the toil and suffering of war. This is 
the kind of deep thought and humanity that finds itself excluded from most histories of 
Coolidge.  
 How do the general ideas on war and peace from Coolidge’s speeches further play 
into the realm of his foreign policy? According to historian L. John Van Til the “principle 
issues for Coolidge included peace initiatives, collection of war-time debt, arms 
limitation, stimulation of trade, and an active effort to create good will among nations.”173  
Clearly the ideas of peace shine through in that list as does Coolidge’s domestic and 
foreign policy of trying to increase prosperity. War and more unpaid debts would hinder 
both of those aims.  
 From another point of view, independent journalist Charles Johnson believed that 
“Coolidge’s foreign policy was simple but elegant.”174  What was this simple and elegant 
plan? In his State of the Union Address from December 6, 1923, Coolidge asserted: “We 
attend to our own affairs, conserve our own strength, and protect the interests of our own 
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citizens…we recognize thoroughly our own obligation to help others, reserving to the 
decision of our judgement the time, the place, and the method.”175  This differs little from 
other speeches made during his presidency:  
Our country has never sought to be a military power. It cherishes no 
imperialistic designs, it is not infatuated with any vision of empire. It is 
content within its own territory, to prosper through the development of its 
own resources. But we realize thoroughly that no one will protect us 
unless we protect ourselves. Domestic peace and international security are 
among the first objects to be sought by any government.176 
The themes of peace continue to resonate. Coolidge’s foreign policy directions are clearly 
focused through those ideas of peace and maybe more importantly, the progress and 
prosperity of America domestically. Regardless of his points or ideas on peace, his 
intentions are always what he thinks is best for his homeland, just as George Washington 
would have wanted it.  
 Coolidge greatly relied on the knowledge and abilities of men other than himself 
in regards to his foreign policy decisions and actions. Part of this was due to it being a 
weakness of his coming into the presidency. Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Law 
Professor at the University of North Carolina, believes that “Coolidge had no interest in 
foreign affairs” when he became president. This caused him to leave many of the initial 
decisions in those areas to his secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes.177 This stance by 
Gerhardt is a simplification of reality at best. As we shall see, Coolidge was not only 
involved and aware of foreign policy concerns, but he would also assume a bigger role 
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over time. That inexperience was not the only reason he put trust in Hughes (and later 
Kellogg) in regards to foreign policy: 
It is not sufficient to entrust details to some one else. They must be 
entrusted to some one who is competent. The Presidency is primarily an 
executive office. It is placed at the apex of our system of government. It is 
a place of last resort to which all questions are brought that others have not 
been able to answer. The ideal way for it to function is to assign to the 
various positions men of sufficient ability under their jurisdiction. If there 
is a troublesome situation in Nicaragua, a General McCoy can manage it. 
If we have differences with Mexico, a Morrow can compose them. If there 
is unrest in the Philippines, a Stimson can quiet them.178  
This idea of expecting others to do their job should not be confused with Coolidge being 
lazy, not being up to the task, or being unwilling to take a stand. Instead this ability to 
delegate, put people in positions of power, and expect them to do their job competently or 
be replaced should be understood for what it is and not dismissed as simply him 
possessing no interest in foreign policy. A President’s job is not to try and do everything 
on his own. He is a single part, albeit the most important part, of one of the three 
branches that constitute our government.  
The gravity of his role as president is not lost on Coolidge, nor is he wanting to 
delegate away his responsibilities. Later in that same reminiscence he continues, “While 
it is wise for the President to get all the competent advice possible, final judgements are 
necessarily his own.” No one is able to make those decisions but him and his “decisions 
are final and usually irreparable.”179  This stance highlights how seriously he takes the 
job of President. 
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 Another key aspect of Coolidge’s foreign policy is carried over from his approach 
to domestic policy. That is avoiding idle talk or repeating discussion of events and 
situations where nothing new can be said. He spoke to this in a press conference in 1925: 
“It isn’t helpful for me to keep talking about certain foreign relations unless there is some 
development that warrants some statement on my part. I didn’t really want to keep 
rehashing practically the same thing, because it irritates foreign countries oftentimes and 
they wonder why the White House keeps making statements that don’t appear to them to 
be very helpful.”180  This is a fascinating hint at the mindset of Coolidge and allows us 
insight into knowing that if he actually discusses something in his speeches in relation to 
foreign policy (or anything else for that matter) we should sit up and pay real attention.  
 Before looking at specifics from Coolidge’s foreign policy we need to look at an 
otherwise largely ignored concern from author Charles Johnson that has some impact on 
the president’s ability to conduct business on the world stage. Johnson claims that the 
adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, which required the direct election of 
senators by the people, “hobbled” Coolidge’s presidency.181  Now these claims are the 
furthering of an argument made by his former professor and adviser on his book. Ralph 
Rossum of Claremont McKenna College studied the dangerous damage that direct 
election of the Senate may have had on our nation. The direction of his study is much 
more focused on the late 20th century than Johnson’s application.182  
                                                          
180 Howard H. Quint and Robert H. Ferrell, eds. The Talkative President: The Off-the-Record Press 
Conferences of Calvin Coolidge (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1964), 25-26.  
181 Johnson, Why Coolidge Matters, 216.  
182 See Ralph Rossum, Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventh Amendment: The Irony of 
Constitutional Democracy (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001).  
76 
 
 
 
Why is this a problem? Should the people not have a say in electing the members 
of the Senate? For Johnson, the problem is that leaving this to the vote of the people led 
to “a partisan demagoguing of defense issues.”183  He takes this concern even further 
saying that this was against the Founding Father’s plans as this left the Senate “far from 
being inoculated against popular prejudices as the framers of the Constitution 
intended.”184  Specifically he claims that this affected Coolidge’s presidency at least 
twice: “during the anti-Japanese hysteria” of the 1924 Immigration Act and the debates 
over the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the international attempt to outlaw war.185  Johnson’s 
concerns do not stop there, however. In the first he blames the Senate for stoking racial 
fear and the in the second for playing on the naïve hopes that world had for peace 
following World War I. He then calls out specifically Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and 
William Borah, who were chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1920-
24 and 1924-33 respectively, for wielding the delusions of “unreasonable fear and 
unrealistic hope.”186  This line of thought is important for us to consider when looking at 
Coolidge’s foreign policy. No president is judge, jury, and executioner when it comes to 
foreign affairs. Congress will have their say and Secretaries of State also play their role.   
Coolidge was not oblivious to this problem that the Senate presented as he 
remembered years later in his autobiography that “The Senate had but one fixed rule, 
subject to exceptions of course…that the Senate would do anything it wanted to do 
whenever it wanted to do it. When I had learned that, I did not waste much time with the 
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other rules, because they were so seldom applied.”187  This is not where Coolidge’s 
complaints about the Senate ended. In another passage he wrote, “If the Senate has any 
weakness it is because the people have sent to that body men lacking the necessary ability 
and character to perform the proper functions.”188  Note that in neither of these statements 
is the former president complaining about the Seventeenth Amendment directly, but the 
results of that change clearly affected him and his ability to work with that legislative 
body. By complaining about people sending the unfit and those resulting choices of 
individuals not abiding by any real rules, Coolidge offers quite a bit of ammunition in 
support of the arguments of both Rossum and Johnson.  
 The biggest point to take away from Johnson’s concern and our earlier 
examination of Coolidge’s speeches is that his administration is a player on the world 
stage. While the 17th Amendment has bearing on domestic policy too, its effect would 
seem more severe for a president attempting to engage in foreign policy. Coolidge did not 
establish America’s global presence, but he certainly had a role in expanding and 
continuing that tradition. Immigration changes, naval limitations, the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact, the Pan American Conference, uprisings and revolutions in Nicaragua and China, 
and even questions about a potential World Court dominated Coolidge’s time in the 
White House.  
 Immigration straddles the line between domestic and foreign policy. On one hand 
the laws and decisions are very much domestically focused and applied. Yet, on the 
other, decisions to limit or exclude certain nations or people can have international 
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repercussions. In one speech Coolidge drew a connection between our immigration 
policy and the, as he saw it, anti-imperialistic intentions of the nation, saying, “We are 
against aggression and imperialism not only because we believe in local self-government, 
but because we do not want more territory inhabited by foreign people. Our exclusion of 
immigration should make that plain,” and that “our outlying possessions, with the 
exception of the Panama Canal Zone, are not a help to us, but a hindrance. We hold them, 
not as a profit, but as a duty.”189 Regardless of what sphere of presidential politics we 
believe the policies of immigration inhabit, the choices made in signing the 1924 
Immigration Act do have ramifications beyond our borders.190  
 Another early initiative that faced Coolidge was that of naval limitations or 
disarmament. In many ways these talks over naval limitations, limiting both the number 
and size of certain ships, were inherited like the immigration changes when he 
unexpectedly found himself president. However, unlike the latter, Coolidge did not find 
himself having to sign off on any of this as agreements had been reached under President 
Harding’s watch in the 1921 Washington Conference. This gathering of nations was one 
of about a half of dozen similar conferences that called for a limit on armaments and/or 
the sizes of navies.191  All of these conferences that took place in the years after World 
War I “found the United States, which had repudiated the League [of Nations], heavily 
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involved in the alternative approach to security.”192 The result of the 1921 conference 
was that America would scuttle thirty major ships if the Japanese would do so with 
seventeen of theirs and the British with nineteen.193 Unfortunately those talks were only 
the beginning and they would continue to differing degrees throughout Coolidge’s own 
years in office. He specifically discussed that original conference stating that, “For the 
purpose of naval limitation we called the Washington Conference and secured an 
agreement as to capital ships and airplane carriers, and also as to the maximum unit 
tonnage and maximum caliber of guns of cruisers.”194  This was done without limiting the 
numbers of cruisers, lesser craft, and submarines. He then accuses the foreign 
governments of trying to limit the number of permissible craft in categories which the 
United States dominated. In light of that, he saw our nations’ willingness to agree to such 
terms as something to be commended; a “demonstration to others of our good faith in 
advocating the principle of limitations.”195  Coolidge still had reservations.  
 For, despite his calls for peace, Coolidge was quite keen on the ideas of a strong 
national defense. To accomplish that goal required a well-trained, but small standing 
army, as many of the Founding Fathers would have agreed if they wanted one at all, and 
a strong navy. Comparing our naval needs and limiting accordingly could be detrimental 
to our navy’s ability to defend us because it “is obvious that, eliminating all competition, 
world standards of defense require us to have more cruisers.”196  Concern over this may 
go beyond harkening all the way back to the likes of George Washington. In 1890, 
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Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a lecturer in naval history and the president of the United 
States Naval War College, published The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–
1783. This groundbreaking work highlighted the importance and necessity of a strong 
navy.  Mahan’s argument would have certainly resonated with a president who believed 
in trade, economic frugality, and protecting one’s interests all along the sea routes on 
“great highway.” 197 There is no clear evidence that Coolidge read Mahan’s work, but it 
not out of the realm of possibility. Even if he did not, it is highly likely that some of his 
advisors and many within the ranks of the military hierarchy at this time did.198  
  It should certainly be clear by now that despite all of Coolidge’s talk of peace 
that he was not a pacifist. While he was opposed to fighting except in the form of self-
defense or where our aid was required by request, he was not totally opposed to such 
actions and proudly spoke of heroic deeds done by men in war. Van Til thinks differently 
on this issue as he believes that Coolidge’s opposition to war “rested on several factors, 
including a strong distaste for the destruction of human life in wars.” The other reasons 
offered – expense, waste, disruption to social progress – actually seem to be more 
problematic for Coolidge.199  However, he does not appear entirely opposed to war, but 
finds great solace in the idea of some type of “just war.” The idea of his support for a 
certain type of justified war or military intervention is ever clearer as his presidency 
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continues and his involvement deepens; particularly his support for the outlawing of war 
and his decision to send troops into Nicaragua in 1927.  
 The Kellogg-Briand Pact is certainly the most famous piece of foreign policy that 
crossed Coolidge’s desk. The context within which this idea of outlawing war was raised 
is in the period of relative global peace in the decade following the First World War: “If 
one word was repeated more often than any other during the years after poignantly 
memorable Armistice, that word was ‘peace.’ Peace echoed through so many sermons, 
speeches, and state papers that it drove itself into the consciousness of everyone.”200  
Coolidge was one of those people echoing peace throughout his speeches. He discussed 
this pact at length on two occasions. The first was made while negotiations were still 
ongoing. 
As is well known, we are also engaged in conversations with different 
powers for putting peace on a new basis and making it still more 
permanent. In June, 1927, M. Briand, the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, made an historic proposal to this Government. He suggested that 
France and the United States sign a treaty condemning recourse to war and 
renouncing it as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations. 
During the 11 months that have since elapsed, this suggestion has been 
developed into one of the most impressive peace movements that the 
world has ever seen. The United States has accepted the principle 
underlying M. Briand's suggestion and has advocated its extension so as to 
include within the scope of the proposed treaty not only France and the 
United States, but also Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Japan, and any 
other nations of the world that might care to join with these six powers in 
a common renunciation of war. 
In order to facilitate discussion and to demonstrate that a treaty such as 
that desired by the United States could be short, simple, and 
straightforward, Mr. Kellogg, Secretary of State, submitted on April 13, 
1928, for the consideration of the other interested powers, a preliminary 
draft of a treaty representing in a general way the form of treaty which he 
suggested we were prepared to conclude. This draft treaty has met with 
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very favorable reception. Not only has the idea of a multilateral treaty for 
the renunciation of war been indorsed by public opinion here and abroad 
but the governments themselves have approached the matter with an 
interest and a sympathy which is most encouraging.201 
This lengthy discussion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact is important for many reasons. One is 
that Coolidge felt confident enough in the talks to bring this up while making a speech at 
the end of May 1928. The second, is that Coolidge made it a habit to not talk about 
situations unless something new or worthwhile was worthy of discussion. The length at 
which he spoke on this occasion and the details he offers should tell us that this pact is 
quite a big deal for the administration and the country.  It is quite odd that the president 
did not mention any of the real American origins of this idea.  
 While it is true that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand, 
proposed the ideas of this pact to the United States, that is not the true starting point. In 
fact, it was James Shotwell, a Columbia University professor, who called Briand to 
action. Yet the American origins and influence did not stop there as Shotwell teamed up 
with Salmon Levinson, an attorney, and Senator William Borah of Idaho in advancing 
this plan. This involvement from Borah in the drafting and furthering of this pact 
highlights the concerns voiced by Johnson earlier in regards to the Seventeenth 
Amendment as it “indicates the problem of senatorial involvement in foreign policy that 
Hamilton most feared.” 202  So why did Coolidge not mention any of this? Perhaps he felt 
constrained by time. More likely, he was already having feelings of ill will towards the 
expanding senatorial powers that he discussed in his autobiography.  
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 Another major role of Coolidge during his tenure was continuing and contributing 
to the existing policy of occupying and deploying troops to areas in Central America and 
the Caribbean. Historian Max Boot believes there have been two ways that the United 
States has waged war throughout our history. The first is that most celebrated and 
studied: the large wars – like the American Civil War and World War II. The second is 
the far less celebrated tradition of fighting small wars. Many of these occurred prior to 
the Great Depression with the U.S. Marines making 180 landings around the world 
between 1800 and 1934.203  This second form of conflict is quite commonplace to us 
now, just as it would have been to President Coolidge as he felt compelled to send 
thousands of Marines to Nicaragua during 1926-7.  
Nicaragua was not the only place that required military action from his 
administration, but it is the most interesting. Coolidge did not see the action taken there 
as a war. Instead he described the situation this way: 
Though we have at this time some of our forces in Haiti, Nicaragua, and 
China, they are in none of these places for the purpose of making war, but 
for the purpose of insuring peaceful conditions under which the rights of 
our nationals and their property may receive that protection to which they 
are entitled under the terms of international law. Our further purpose in 
Haiti and Nicaragua is to assist the peoples and governments of those two 
countries in establishing stability, in maintaining orderly and peaceful 
institutions in harmony with civilized society. We are there at their express 
invitation and in accordance with explicit agreements.204 
This is how he is describing the American role in its own backyard. Our reason for being 
in countries like Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua and even China has little to do with war in his 
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mind. 205 This is not exactly the time to get into definitions of war and occupation of other 
nations, but Coolidge believes that Marines fought and died in this mission to establish 
stability, maintain order, and allow for harmony in their peaceful institutions. At its 
height, there were more than 5,000 servicemen in Nicaragua in an attempt by the United 
States government to ensure that the election of 1928 would occur peacefully and fairly. 
That was the most soldiers ever stationed there.206  Taking into account all causes – 
disease, accident, suicide, homicide – there were 136 Marines lost in Nicaragua from 
1926-1933.207  While Coolidge chose to not consider this response a war, it resulted in 
the death of Americans and the spending of money that could have potentially served 
better causes. However, we should also remember that Coolidge was not the reason we 
were there originally. His decision to return our military to the region was likely rooted in 
a feeling of an obligation to fulfill our initial purpose and concern over the potential of 
more instability or conflict in an area so close to home and America’s interests 
(especially the Panama Canal).  
 Part of Coolidge’s fascination with Central America and the Caribbean stemmed 
from the desire for stability in and around the Panama Canal. As with many aspects of his 
foreign policy, this did not begin with him. Concerns with stability and peace in the 
region were the basis for the different Pan-American Conferences. President Coolidge 
made three lengthy speeches surrounding these conferences. Not all were the same type 
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of conference, but they all addressed those concerns by bringing together leadership from 
different American nations to have them engage in meaningful dialogue.  
 The first of these conferences that Coolidge addressed was the 1927 Third Pan 
American Commercial Conference in Washington, D.C. His opening line speaks directly 
to the conference’s purpose: “The Pan American movement rests on the principle of 
mutual helpfulness.”208  These Pan American conferences were a commercial venture that 
represented private industry and trade among the American nations which left it in a 
semiofficial place where the government was only there to “promote and encourage” as 
“governments do not have commercial relations.”209  Coolidge appears to believe that 
creating a stable environment for trade and giving economies and industries room grow 
will reduce potential needs for wars. As he stated, this type of agreement relies heavily 
upon the principle of mutual helpfulness, as well as cooperation from dozens of nations.    
 The second of the conferences actually saw Coolidge paying a visit to Cuba in 
January of 1928. Until President Barrack Obama’s visit in 2016, he had been the last 
American president to set foot upon that island. Coolidge’s visit was almost as big a deal. 
His speech was far less dedicated to ideas of economics as the one a year earlier had 
been. Instead, this speech focused upon the idea of political stability and maintaining 
peace in the Caribbean and throughout the Americas. He discussed the almost 100-year 
history of this gathering and highlights their continued principles “of international 
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relations, and in the practical ability of putting them into effect.”210  This conference had 
an important place in the world: 
The Pan American Conferences meet for the purpose of maintaining and 
extending these important principles. It is impossible to conceive of a 
more inspiring motive which men could entertain in dealing with the 
affairs of this world. You have convened to take counsel together for 
increasing the domestic welfare of the free people of our independent 
republics and promoting international peace. No other part of the world 
could provide constituencies which all have such a unity of purpose. The 
whole atmosphere of the Conference is animated with the spirit of 
democracy and good will. This is the fundamental concept of your 
organization. All nations here represented stand on an exact footing of 
equality. The smallest and the weakest speaks here with the same authority 
as the largest and the most powerful.211 
With this passage, Coolidge speaks to the intentions of the conference as well as his own 
motives. He sees great merit in spreading the ideals of democracy through the Western 
Hemisphere. As we have seen with Nicaragua he is willing to do so by force if necessary.  
 The last of these conferences that Coolidge addressed was the Pan American 
Conference on Arbitration and Conciliation, 1928. Like the others, this meeting brought 
together almost two dozen nations “who have a common purpose to advance the cause of 
civilization by substituting the obligation of reason for the coercion of force.”212  His 
focus on the ideas of peace change little over the course of his speeches and with this 
speech he is certainly utilizing the rhetoric that the nation and the world wanted to hear 
after the horrors of World War I. These conferences highlight the importance that the 
American government and Coolidge’s foreign policy placed upon the areas of Central 
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and South America and the Caribbean. Protecting our coastal waters and the Panama 
Canal were paramount.   
 The final piece of Coolidge’s foreign policy that bears mention here is his support 
of the World Court. The attempt to form this international organization is a complicated 
tale that covers many years prior to his presidency. The idea of a World Court was not 
new and had been discussed in America multiple times in the 1800s.213  Historian Denna 
Frank Fleming blames the United States Senate for the problems surrounding its creation 
or adoption. Fleming is “critical of the Senate’s long-established ways of killing peace 
treaties.” For him, this is a tradition that deserves the blame for their blocking the League 
of Nations as well.214  Coolidge put the fate of America’s involvement in such a court in 
the Senate’s hands: 
I have advocated adherence to such a court by this Nation on condition 
that the statute or treaty creating it be amended to meet our views. The 
Senate has adopted a resolution for that purpose. 
While the nations involved can not yet be said to have made a final 
determination, and from most of them no answer has been received, many 
of them have indicated that they are unwilling to concur in the conditions 
adopted by the resolution of the Senate. While no final decision can be 
made by our Government until final answers are received, the situation has 
been sufficiently developed so that I feel warranted in saying that I do not 
intend to ask the Senate to modify its position. I do not believe the Senate 
would take favorable action on any such proposal, and unless the 
requirements of the Senate resolution are met by the other interested 
nations I can see no prospect of this country adhering to the court.215 
So, if the Senate should bear the blame, as Fleming believes, then Coolidge is equally as 
guilty. Despite his desire for American participation he is unwilling to force the hand of 
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the Senate. He is playing by the rules and might be the only one involved who is doing 
so. That is not to say that Coolidge was deviating from his values and ideals. His 
statement following that lengthy passage was that, “while we recognize the obligations 
arising from the war and the common dictates of humanity which ever bind us to a 
friendly consideration for other people, our main responsibility is for America.”216  
Indeed, Coolidge is sticking to his values and ideals by not wanting to overstep his role as 
he sees it. He is putting America first and always, just as he believes Washington would 
have wanted it.  
Instead of a lazy, “silent” man, through these speeches and their level of 
involvement of Coolidge upon the global stage we are granted glimpses of a man who 
exhibit far greater knowledge, initiative, rationality, and a sense of his role as president 
than most historians grant him. Perhaps, if he is guilty of anything it is being somewhat 
naïve in his attempt to look for the best in humankind. From his own words we see a 
president that is driven by deep-seated ideals and is not afraid to walk upon the world 
stage and speak or act upon those beliefs. His confidence with such endeavors does grow 
as he embraces his unexpected role as commander-in-chief. He was deeply invested in 
our nation’s concerns and trying to better the world for his contemporaries and future 
generations. Coolidge has been misrepresented and misunderstood. Let this study of his 
speeches give us pause as we look back at his presidency and let us reconsider the way 
we think about this man’s role in American history, politics, and foreign policy.  
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Conclusion 
C. Bascom Slemp, who served briefly as Coolidge’s secretary, described a 
“characteristic” passage from the President as “no surplus verbiage, short, epigrammatic 
sentences, an elevated tone growing in spirit until it constitutes a moving appeal.”217  
Surely this approach of style and delivery, along with his reluctance to address issues that 
contained no new developments, and his reliance on others to do the tasks assigned, 
contributed to our willingness to discount Coolidge’s knowledge of and impact upon 
America’s foreign policy during the 1920s. While Coolidge’s time in office certainly 
contains no famous speeches or actions relating to foreign policy, as we get from 
Wilson’s attempts to create a new world order for peace or Roosevelt’s speech after the 
surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor plunged American into war again, their absence, 
however, does not imply that his presidency was dedicated to inactivity or inaction as 
many writers and historians would have us believe.  
The presidential transitions that took place between 1920 and 1925 greatly 
impacted the direction of the nation, both at home and abroad. The degree to which the 
rejection of the Democrats and Wilsonian ideas swept the nation in favor of Harding is 
proof of people’s desire for a change. Change on the global stage takes time. As we have 
discussed, the number of actors, intentions, and plans involved drag out both good and 
bad results. While change is often slow to happen domestically, the problem is vastly 
amplified with more nations, politics, and egos involved. With this in mind, if we take a 
minute to really appreciate the changes that do and do not occur under the shift from 
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Wilson to Harding, we need to understand why. The problem for us is that to answer that 
is far beyond the scope of our discussion here. That shift was presented to help show, 
ever so briefly, the repercussions of the actions of the administrations that preceded 
Coolidge’s.  
Another required piece of my argument was to try and understand how and why 
Coolidge may have thought the way he did. The influences of both Anson Morse and 
Charles Garman during Coolidge’s time at Amherst College cannot be overstated. While 
work has been done on this influence, here and in other writings, there are still 
connections to be pursued. One area worthy of more consideration is the depth of 
potential influences of Morse’s teachings as he was published more widely and we have 
access to much more of his ideas. 
Despite the literature surrounding Coolidge and despite my efforts here, there is 
still more to be gained from an even more detailed analysis and evaluation of the 
speeches of our 30th president. Adding his words and ideas to our presentation of him will 
only create more depth and knowing to our understanding of the 1920s. By largely 
ignoring these sources and only repeating the words of historians like Schlesinger we are 
doing a disservice to reality and truth. Perhaps Coolidge really did sleep longer and more 
often than any other president. However, that is only a piece of the life that Coolidge led. 
The speeches examined in Chapter Three show us that he was aware of the world and her 
problems. They show that he was concerned about peace, war, freedom, and prosperity, 
both here and abroad. Coolidge and his administration took steps to improve the 
relationship with Mexico, they tried to protect the American people and her interests by 
maintaining peace in places like Nicaragua. They also made huge strides to promote 
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peace globally by supporting attempts to outlaw war through the Kellogg-Briand Pact and 
establish a World Court. In the realm of economics and a drive to promote even greater 
prosperity they worked to foster trade and respect between all of the nations that make up 
North and South America. These are not the visions of Coolidge that many historic 
accounts offer.  
By trying to better recreate the world as it would have been for both Coolidge and 
America at this time we can come to see all of these pieces and their interactions 
differently. Instead of inaction and inactivity, we see from Coolidge thoughtful and 
prudent action and an expectation of other men in his administration to do their jobs. 
Instead of a United States cut off from the world, hoarding her wealth, ignoring the cries 
and pleas of others, and sitting alone in isolation, we might see global and regional 
cooperation, the expansion of international trade, and the desire to create peace separately 
from political entanglements like the League of Nations. These visions of President 
Coolidge and American foreign policy in the 1920s should change the way we think 
about and teach the period. This is not a time of nothing and isolation between World 
War I and the Great Depression and New Deal. This is instead a time of hopeful peace 
talks, international trade, and military inventions that require more discussion.   
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